UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

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# AN ANALYSIS OF THE GROUP CONCEPT

HAZEL MAY HUSSONG

A THESIS

IN PHILOSOPHY

PRESENTED TO THE FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL IN
PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR
THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

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CONTENTS

PAGE

I

INTRODUCTION ..... 7

II

THE ANALOGISTS: MORPHOLOGICAL ..... 18

III

THE ANALOGISTS: PHYSIOLOGICAL ..... 41

IV

THE ANALOGISTS: PSYCHOLOGICAL; TELEOLOGICAL ..... 60

V

THE GROUP AS AN EMPIRICAL CONCEPT ..... 80

# I

## Introduction

Compared with the problems facing the group, those peculiar to the individual seem small and unimportant. The dominance of group-interests over individual interests has become increasingly apparent to the study of the last hundred years, until today a theory very prevalent in the eighteenth century finds few adherents. We are no longer content to look upon the individual as being of such self-sufficient nature that to be happy he needs but to be released from the tyranny of civilized society. Our thought has returned to older models; our views of human nature are much closer to those of the ancient moralists than to those of Hobbes and Rousseau. Just as Aristotle held that no one, except he be god or beast, could exist outside of society, so thinkers of the present regard man as an individual who is most completely individual only when he expresses his nature as a member of society.

The importance of association being so great, it is not surprising that the reflective mind of all ages should have endeavored to resolve the riddle of a nature that finds its highest individuality in a loss of independence. This long effort toward the understanding of a phenomenon as familiar as it is puzzling, is so far from having approached a generally accepted conclusion, that there are those who consider it to have advanced little beyond its beginnings; and indeed von Wiese[1] is not without excuse for his complaint that the most modern sociology is still too much governed by a superstitious belief in the adequacy and efficacy of rudimentary, unevolved conceptions. It may well be that the ignorance, the unsteadiness of judgment, the inability to estimate rightly the forces of social life, with which we attempt to deal with social problems confronting us, are all due to a single cause; they may all be due to a lack of sociological definition. The fundamental problem upon which all other social problems rest, the careful definition of the group, is too often left

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[1] *Sociology: Its History and Main Problems*, p. 6.

untouched. The ultimate question, What new thing is born of the relationship of two or more human beings facing the world together? is too often unasked. And where definition of this new thing arising out of human relationships has been sought, the findings of individual seekers remain in hopeless conflict one with another. For this reason an analysis of the meaning to be attached to the term "social group" seems the most important task of all the tasks that face the student of social phenomena.

No doubt the most promising approach to the question, How should one define the collective thing called a society? lies along the historic way which begins by asking, What have thinkers taken this collective term to mean? This is so true that a certain influential school of current opinion looks upon the question just proposed as of no other than historic interest. No doubt, this school would pretend, an historic interest must always attach to an inquiry that would take in on its way a matter of such world-old curiosity as that which inspires the enduring question, What was it that man from the earliest times has recognized to be the commanding object of his loyalty, when in the name of "patriotism" he has been willing to sacrifice his very life to this object? This object, called the State, has always been composed of many members of most diversified private interest; yet each one of these has recognized the claim of one and the same thing, this State, upon his individual devotion. One can hardly avoid calling this one thing laying collective claim on the distributive loyalty of all men living within certain bounds, a *group* of some sort. But then, our "individualists" would point out, the only meaning this *group* could take on was the practical meaning it had for, the active recognition it received from, those who acknowledged themselves its worshipers; and certainly one may worship idols of the imagination.

With this modern doctrine in mind, it may be well to consider, before undertaking an historical study, whether or not this history has come to be recognized as the history of an illusion.

Current theory accepting the "individualistic" interpretation of the "social group", generally recognizes its more or less

direct indebtedness to the thought Simmel developed in his *Soziologie* and other works. Simmel's position is well known. He admits of course a certain appearance of what might be called a "social group", a something objective over and above the aggregate of human beings living in social relations within it, a something absolved from the limitations of all these private lives. But he insists that there could be no more fatal illusion than to take this *appearance* for a reality. It would be an absurdity, for example, to attribute to this "group" any such life, mind, or spirit as would add one more individual life, mind, or spirit to the number of lives, minds, or spirits already attributed to the human beings composing this social group. Any attempt to think of one living, mentally endowed, spiritual, personal entity, whose coming into being is conditioned on and consequent to the gathering together of many *men*, and whose life, mind, spirit or person adds one to the number of lives, minds, spirits or persons accounted for by numbering these men, is the product of a mysticism similar to that conceptual realism which throughout the history of human reflection has insisted on making independent, substantial entities of all sorts of human ideas.[2] These views of Simmel, into whose historic antecedents we need not here inquire, proved so influential upon subsequent sociology that forty years after their formulation we find responsible sociological opinion maintaining that the conception of a group possessing a life or mind or spirit or personality of its own had definitely "perished at the hands of progress."[3] This opinion, carefully avoiding all reference to a collective entity of any kind, would explain so-called "group behavior" exclusively in terms of such behaviors as biology, psychology, and other sciences would recognize as natural to the types of individual composing the aggregate considered as a group. The "error" of imagining a science developing laws directly applicable to integral groups, laws not themselves corollaries of any that other sciences might develop as applicable to the types of individual composing the

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[2] Simmel, G., *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 3, p. 665.
Allport F. H., *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 29, p. 688.

group, is frequently referred to by the sociological "individualist" as the "group fallacy."[4]

That individualism deriving from Simmel, continues to be vigorously supported in the literature of the latest moment, may readily be seen by referring to the writings of Sorokin and others. And if this individualism may be considered to have entirely won over to its point of view the influential thought of the day, if it seriously promises to control the development of the future, our present study could have only antiquarian interest and should be undertaken in no other spirit. But as a matter of fact, the literature of sociology furnishes no evidence that the individualist tendencies emanating from Simmel have in any way discouraged the vigor of their "collectivist" opponents. If there is one side that would dismiss the problem of a group's meaning, the very hypothesis of a group's existence, with the epithet "group fallacy", there is another side quick to retort with the "fallacy of the group fallacy". In face of all criticism the collectivist continues to see in any group properly to be called "social" an individual that adds one to the number of individuals which exclusive of it would be recognized as possessing life, mind, spirit, personality, or some other of those attributes the individualist denies to be attributable to any subject save a human, or at least a biological, individual. A few examples of this collectivist opinion will enable us better to judge at the outset of our study, whether its emphasis should be determined by the interests of the archaeologist or by the needs of a science in process of construction.

In an article entitled "The Independence of Social Psychology"[5] we find Wallis arguing the case for collectivism, with an old vigor and a new clarity. A manifold, it would seem, is to be called a group, and this group is to be called an entity, when the manifold shows persistence of qualities, and when the parts of which it is composed are mutually interdependent. In such case it functions as a unity, and is one in all reality. Those who refuse to ascribe reality to the group do so because

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[4] *Ibid.*, p. 691.

[5] *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, Vol. 20, pp. 147–150.

they tacitly assume analysis to be superior to synthesis. But consider this analogy: if of a "human being" we saw only the cells and the cell-aggregates, would it not be difficult to envisage this manifold as a functioning unit? With respect to these cells as elements, the individualist is a convinced synthetist whenever he speaks of a human being as an individual; yet his sociology would treat this product of synthesis as though it were a limit of analysis, the ultimate element of "reality". Your individualist refuses to acknowledge the synthesis by which he himself has arrived at the notion of a human individual; he takes the individuality of this complex theory to imply "indivisibility". But, of course, a man is no more a single individual than he is a billion individuals, old ones going, new ones coming at every moment from birth to death. In truth, the things discovered by analysis possess no higher unity than those discovered by synthesis; analysis and synthesis are merely differently methods of approaching the study of things, for becoming acquainted with the nature of the world in which we live and which lives in us. The social psychologist who finds the psychology of a living individual to be the only psychology, is paying homage to the superior reality of what is to be found by analysis; yet, inconsistently enough, he would not admit a given cell to possess a higher order of reality than does the living organism analysable into this and similar cells. As a matter of fact, throughout the organic world, the dependence of whole on part, and of part on whole, is mutual. The nature of the cell depends on the nature of the organism, the nature of the organism on the nature of the cell, in exactly equal measure. Social groups and the human elements composing them stand in the same relation of mutual dependence; each is understood only in so far as is the other. Finally, just as one can read continuity and interdependence into the elements composing an individual psychology, so one can read it into the elements composing the psychological behavior of a unified group. But in the end, group activities can be understood only by studying group activity; in all phenomena of the group we are dealing with the manifestation of self-sufficient social reality. Knowledge of individual psychologies can no more enable us to predict

differences of group-behavior, than a study of their respective cells can enable us to anticipate the difference in behavior of two individual men. And just as the behavior of "A" and "B" can be understood only in terms transcending the biology of their individual cells, so the behavior of "A-group" and "B-group" can be explained only in terms transcending the psychology of their individual men.

In these views Wallis is closely followed by Markey,[6] who holds the social group to represent a distinct type of object in the world of our experience, holds the springs of group action to be inconceivable in terms of motives that might operate as effectively outside of the group as in it. Group-motives are not to be sought in the individual *apart from* the group, but only in the individual *as part of* the group; where the group is destroyed these springs perish with it. In many and various ways experience shows the individual to recognize the group as another individual. He responds to the group in form of the family irrespective of the personalities composing it; he responds to the group in many other forms without giving attention to their memberships; he formulates laws of group behavior intended to hold for groups severally composed of unlike human elements. From all this, one can only conclude that any study of the group as a natural being requires and must construct for itself its own frame of reference.

With these examples of the persistent vigor of collectivist opinion may well be associated one other whose argument leads to an identical conclusion, although it starts from other considerations and follows another way. The reasoning of Wallis and Markey, it will be noticed, has advanced such facts and presented such arguments as might be expected from any discipline which, claiming to be an experimental science, would set forth experimental evidence for the existence of the class of objects with which it as a science would deal. An argument so constructed will rather avoid than dwell upon any moral value whose recognition may depend upon the existence or non-existence of

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[6] *Recent Trends in American Sociology*, ed. Lundberg, Bain and Anderson, p.149.

the objects its argument would establish. Now, in contrast with what might be called this disinterested argument from experience, current literature presents examples of another order of reasoning whose program would seem to be, first of all to establish the value to certain of our human interests of a class of objects whose existence is in question; then, having demonstrated the value of a certain object, to consider the existence of this valuable object to be an implication of its value, since it could obviously have no value, had it not so much as existence. It is from the point of view of a philosophic method built on these premises that Urban[7] approaches the question of the existence of a social person.

Urban's argument is best conceived as an answer to certain individualist contentions that had gone before. The "individualist" is frequently found to urge in support of his nihilistic attitude toward groups, that to attribute personality to groups is not to strengthen the group but to weaken the "person" as an object of moral recognition. MacIver, for example, considers the conception of a group personality to have wrought harm not only to the science of Sociology but to the study of Ethics, Politics, Psychology, Economics as well; for MacIver would have all values to be personal values; all art, all science, all progress to consist in the free expression of creative personality stimulated into activity by the union of its opportunity, and its need for translating idea into reality. But the mode of conception which regards society as a person or a mind, and nationality as something more than the members of a nation, suggests that it is possible to serve nationality otherwise than by serving the members of a nation. In so far as the end and value of society are regarded as other than the ends and values of its members taken as a whole, the latter count for less than before, becoming in so far, mere means to an end which is beyond, not merely each as individual, but all as collective. Not only can we not give meaning to such a value, but the postulation of it deprives of actuality the values we already know and makes of personality an illusion.

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[7] *Philosophical Review*, Vol. 28, pp. 547–561.

To this Urban characteristically replies that we *do* give meaning to such a value every time we pass moral judgments on a group or a nation. Approvingly he quotes Hobson to the effect that *until* we attribute to society such a degree and form of personality as can evolve in us those interests and emotions which personality alone can win, the Social Will will not be able to perform great works. It is of the greatest importance to the practical life that this conception obtain the widest possible acceptance; for so long as society is spoken and thought of as an abstraction, no social conduct is safe and sound. Until we attribute to associations and states a degree and form of personality similar to that accorded our fellows, no genuine moral judgments upon them are possible; no conduct, no collective action on the part of such associations and states can be of sound counsel. Meanwhile, evidence for the existence of the collective mind is not speculative; it is of precisely the same order as evidence for the existence of individual minds. All knowledge of the individual minds of other persons is essentially a "valuing"; and such valuing includes and is the source of our certainty of other minds. That there is such a thing as evidence for value and validity not to be confused with evidence for physical and psychical existence is a matter of familiar knowledge constantly to be borne in mind, along with another important truth; namely, that we may very well know a thing to be, and still have very inadequate ideas of its nature. In the latter connection, it is particularly important to remember that no lack of evidence for this or that analogy intended to illumine the *what* of a collective mind, should be construed as lack of evidence for the reality of the object itself; not, certainly, when we are made aware of the object's reality in almost every pulsation of our valuing life. Nor should our inability to picture the object to our entire satisfaction be interpreted as inability to give concrete meaning to it.

From the foregoing examples of current opinion it is evident enough that the problem of defining social group in terms of its essential attributes is one to be approached in the interests of a science in process of construction, not merely a curious matter

of human history to be recalled in the spirit of an archaeologist. Nevertheless, no issue however live at the moment, however vital to future progress, can be wisely studied apart from the history of its development. The limits of our present undertaking do not of course permit of a complete historical review of a problem of such ancient origin; if social groups have ever existed, such groups have existed ever since there was a state, a tribe, a family in the world. We may, however, find it sufficient for our purpose to recall a few of the more modern stages of our present problem's development; for the issue that most concerns us, however ancient its origin, has received its clearest formulation in times comparatively recent. Indeed, we may say that the concept of a social group in the form in which it shall concern us in the sequel, developed as a reaction against certain interpretations of human social relationships, dating no further back than the end of the seventeenth century. It is from the writings of Hobbes, belonging to this period, that the thinkers of the eighteenth century derived a conception of society which has sometimes been called "atomistic", or "mechanical", and was no doubt influenced by the successful application of mechanical methods throughout the systematic philosophy of Descartes. In fact, this "atomistic" or individualistic view of human life in society, looked upon society as composed of individual human "atoms", drawn together into communities by a force of the personal interest of each atom in inspiring a helpful reaction in others. Thus in the eighteenth century, individuals were supposed to have been drawn together into such communities and states as history tells of, because of mutual fear (Hobbes), or as a result of a social contract into which they had at some time entered (Rousseau), or because of certain inborn social and benevolent instincts (Cumberland, Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, and Butler).

It was against this eighteenth century individualism that the nineteenth century reacted, and it was in the course of this reaction that the group-theories with which we shall be most concerned in the sequel developed. Guided by a historical method in Germany and France, by the biological (in particular, the evolutionary) method in England, the thinkers of this

century were led to the conclusion that man was a being unable to stand alone; that by his own essential nature he must always be a member of a society of men. From this conclusion as a new premise, it was a natural inference that the relation of the individual man to the society in which, as has been said, he must always find himself incorporated, must be not unlike the relation generally recognized to exist between an organ and the biological organism of which it is a member. Among the first to view society as in this sense organic was Auguste Comte. For Comte a human society is indeed an organism whose members are related to each other and to the social unit in which they are incorporated, quite as the organs of a living body are related to each other and to the body of which they are members. The individual human being is then only to be understood as a fraction of some social group; a group from which he has never been separated, apart from which he could never have become human, without which he could not long continue to remain human.

From these beginnings developed in an order we shall presently review, a series of elaborate attempts to list all observable forms of likeness, and to note any observable forms of difference between the attributes of a biological individual and the attributes of a social group likely to be called in the course of this discussion a "social" individual. Consequently, the greater part of this recent history is taken up with accounts of the efforts of various writers to set down such *analogies* as might be found to exist between the life, the mentality, the personality, commonly attributed to human individuals, and the structure, institutions, customs observed to characterize societies. As might be expected of the history of such an undertaking, its progress developed marked differences in the kinds of analogy adduced. The varieties of analogical type fall, however, into a few fairly distinguishable classes; and since the order in which these classes attain to maximum popularity forms only roughly a chronological sequence, in following the thought of the historic analogists it will be more to our purpose to classify their contributions under the heads of the analogical types they illustrate, than to adhere to any chronological order in which their offerings might

be arranged. Leaving it to the sequel to develop the exact sense to be attributed the names used in their classification, we may arrange the topics of future discussion under headings intended to connote the various types of analogy sought in the course of history: namely,

(1) Morphological
(2) Physiological
(3) Psychological
(4) Teleological

It will readily be presumed that a search for analogy between the well-known biological organism with its attributes on the one hand, and the enigmatic social body on the other, is undertaken whether wittingly or unwittingly with an ultimate object in view. Analogies are not and can never be definitions; they are important to a science in process of construction only as steps in a groping progress toward definition. It would no doubt be possible to classify contributors to nineteenth century history in terms of such definitions of the social-group as their respective analogies seem most inevitably to imply. But for the purposes of the historian it is safer to offer in evidence the words his historic characters actually uttered, than to classify them at the offset in terms of such ultimate meanings as his own reflection finds implied in these words. We are content then to present the analogists as no more than analogists, allowing their comment one on the other to develop by a sort of inherent dialectic the suggestion of those definitions to reach which along historic ways is the ultimate object of our study. Such final definitions, or at least the most general considerations to be kept in mind in framing any final definitions, may be reserved as the topic of our last chapter, in its reflections on the profit to science of all that history has contributed.

## II

### The Analogists: Morphological

Auguste Comte's *Course of Positive Philosophy* was not long in bearing fruit, and the first fruits of importance to the science of sociology are doubtless Herbert Spencer's studies in that science. The growth of Comte's influence was rapid. At the time of Spencer's first papers on *Social Statics* [1850], "Comte was to him only a name".[1] In his *Study of Sociology* [1873] Comte is recognized to have been not only the inspiration of his own thought, but the founder of a new science. Of all that had previously been written on the subject of human society, Spencer seems to have caught suggestions from only two obscure works, Hooker's *Ecclesiastical Polity*, and Adam Ferguson's *Essay on the History of Civil Society*. In these he finds seeds of the great idea that was later to transform sociology; the idea, namely, that the science of society is closely connected with the science of the living organism. But, he writes, "before this conception could assume a definite form it was necessary both that scientific knowledge should become more comprehensive and precise and that the scientific spirit should be strengthened. To him, Comte, living when these conditions were fulfilled, is due the credit of having set forth with comparative definiteness, the connexion between the science of life and the science of society." To be sure Spencer, the evolutionist, could not but feel the restrictions under which Comte worked, bound as he was to "the dogma of the fixity of species." "Nevertheless", Spencer concludes his tribute, "we must not overlook the greatness of the step made by M. Comte. His mode of contemplating the facts was truly philosophical. Containing, along with special views not to be admitted, many thoughts that are true as well as large and suggestive, the introductory chapters to his Sociology show a breadth and depth of conception beyond any previously reached. Apart from the tenability of his sociological doctrines, his way of

[1] P. 233.

conceiving social phenomena was much superior to all previous ways: and among other of its superiorities, was this recognition of the dependence of sociology on biology."[2]

This high estimate of Comte was not peculiar to Spencer, but more or less characteristic of a moment in history strongly reactionary against previous "mechanical" models of thought, strongly impressed with the possibilities suggested by a newly developed biology. To a later and more reflective historian, two things would be equally apparent; namely, that just as the Cartesian mechanics which inspired eighteenth century sociology was a return after a long period of neglect to the classic models of a Democritus, Epicurus, Lucretius, so the biological conceptions which guided nineteenth century theory were a reaction against this very reaction. "This recognition of the depend ence of sociology on biology" was not the entirely new thing it was taken to be at the moment of its nineteenth century appearance, but a return to modes of thought which had guided human reflection from the time of Plato, through the Middle Ages, down to the very moment when Descartes himself stripped them of their influence.

What Spencer hails as a discovery of his time, this "way of conceiving social phenomena so much superior to all previous ways", is indeed one of the oldest conceptions to be found in the history of reflection on human society. This is true, down to its very device of establishing this dependence by developing as many analogies as might be thought on between the thing called a *society*, and the thing called a *man*. Of this analogical method, important use is made as early as Plato's *Republic*.[3] Here we find three classes of citizen placed in one-to-one correspondence with three "souls" in man: a governing class, with a rational soul; a military class, with a passionate soul; an industrial class, with an appetitive soul. The virtue specific to each class of citizen is the same in name and nature as the virtue specific to its analogous soul. "Wisdom", "courage", "temperance" are best understood in the light of this analogy; and so

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[2] *The Study of Sociology*, p. 299 f.
[3] *Jowett's Trans. Book IV*, pp. 428–444.

understood, there would seem to be little difference in meaning between a *good* citizen of the state and a *good* organ of the body. This in turn must imply a close similarity of meaning between the body political, called *State*, and the body biological, called *Man*. Under Aristotelian influence, sociology and biology continue to have much in common, while analogical methods distinctly reminiscent of Plato are from time to time to be recovered in early Christian thought. It is not, however, until we come to the Middle Ages that the analogy between *State* and *Man*, from having been an episode of thought, becomes the guiding thread in all social theory. Throughout these ages, the analogy between the political and the human organism remains an assumption of vital importance to the solution of practical problems. Gierke explains the reason for this.

"Medieval thought proceeded from the idea of a single Whole. Therefore, an organic construction of Human Society was as familiar to it as a mechanical and atomistic construction was originally alien. Under the influence of biblical allegories and the models set by Greek and Roman writers, the comparison of Mankind at large and every smaller group to an animate body was universally adopted and pressed . . . Mankind in its Totality was conceived as an Organism . . . Mankind constituted a Mystical Body whereof the Head was Christ. It was just from this principle that the theorists of the ecclesiastical party deduced the proposition that upon earth the Vicar of Christ represents the one and only Head of this Mystical Body; for were the Emperor an additional Head, we should have before us a two headed monster."[4]

Through the writings of John of Salisbury, Aquinas, Colonna, Engelbert, and Ockham, Gierke follows this thread of analogy. Everywhere he finds the conception of mankind as an organism not unlike man, used to show why and in what way State and Church should so live together as to complete each the other; for the State may be likened to the body, the Church to the soul of man. With this an elaborate notion of *membership* was developed, to sanction the varieties of office performed by various men in the hierarchy of ecclesiastical and political groups. It

[4] *Political Theories of the Middle Age*, tr. by F. Maitland, p. 22.

was held that the member is but part of a whole, that the whole is independent of the changes in its parts, that in case of collision the welfare of the member must be sacrificed to that of the group; and also that the whole lives only in its members and every member is of value to the whole. From the same notion of a social organism was derived the necessity of difference in rank, profession, and estate; for the individuals composing different ecclesiastical or different political bodies must be as unexchangeable socially as the elements composing unlike bodily organs are uninterchangeable physiologically.

The foregoing excursus into the domain of history, in showing nineteenth century sociology to be no revolution indeed, but an actual evolution out of old and long enduring habits of thought, should have the effect not of diminishing but of enhancing the value of these later developments. That they *were* developments, not reversions, is obvious from their first page and grows more so with every chapter. With the unexperimental and too practically interested philosophy of the Middle Ages, the scientifically cool and well-informed sociology of the nineteenth century stands in the sharpest contrast—as will immediately be seen on returning to the thought of Spencer.

The whole future course of Spencer's thought is almost to be foreseen from the wording of an opening paragraph in which he presents to the reader "Society as an entity." That we consistently regard a society as an entity is due, he thinks, to the fact that "though formed of discrete units, a certain concreteness in the aggregate of them is implied by the general persistence of the arrangements among them throughout the area occupied. And it is this trait which yields our idea of a society."[5] It may well be supposed that these persistent arrangements, the assumption of which yields our idea of a society, these quasi-anatomical structures of social organization, must play an important part in Spencer's search for an answer to a question that immediately follows. It is the fundamental question of all sociology: "Regarding a society as a thing, what kind of thing must we call it?"

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[5] *Principles of Sociology*, Vol. I, p. 448.

It seems totally unlike every object with which our senses acquaint us. Any likeness it may possibly have to other objects, cannot be manifest to perception, but can be discerned only by reason. If the constant relations among its parts make it an entity; the question arises whether these constant relations among its parts are akin to the constant relations among the parts of other entities. Between a society and anything else, the only conceivable resemblance must be one due to *parallelism of principle in the arrangement of components.*

There are two great classes of aggregates with which the social aggregate may be compared—the inorganic and the organic. Are the attributes of a society in any way like those of a not-living body? or are they in any way like those of a living body? or are they entirely unlike those of both?

The first of these questions needs only to be asked to be answered in the negative. A whole of which the parts are alive, cannot, in its general characters, be like lifeless wholes. The second question, not to be thus promptly answered, is to be answered in the affirmative. The reasons for asserting that the permanent relations among the parts of a society, are analogous to the permanent relations among the parts of a living body, we have now to consider.[6]

In exhibiting the astonishing number of ways in which the *social thing*, that is, e. g., a State, is like the *biological thing* that is e. g. a citizen of this State, Spencer shows a marvelous ingenuity. He is particularly original in the conception of the second of two classes into which these *analogies* naturally fall. For into a first class one would be tempted to gather all those broadest *biological* analogies which go to show the social individual to be like the living in just those readily observable ways in which one living thing resembles another; but into a second class, those definite *structural* analogies between a social and a biological individual to the like of which a morphologist would point in relating one form of life to another. If in following Spencer's presentation of the most general biological analogies, one feels oneself to be witnessing an elaboration of classic and mediaeval motives, on meeting the morphological analogies with which the argument concludes, one cannot but be impressed by the novelty of the technique. For this reason, and in spite of the broad biological considerations with which his analysis opens,

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 448.

we have allowed ourselves to characterize Spencer and those most closely related to him as *morphological* analogists; in contrast with whom certain later analogists, for reasons that shall appear, deserve to be called *physiological* in motive.

*General biological analogies.* Spencer himself groups together under four heads those comparisons of life and society which result in showing three phenomena well-known to characterize *life*, to be no less characteristic of anything to be called a *society.* They are: (1) growth; with which is associated (2) increasing differentiation of structure; and (3) increasing differentiation of function.

Growth. In both biological and in social organisms, growth is evidenced by the same phenomena. In both, there is increase in mass—in the biological individual, an expansion from germ to adult form; in the social, an expansion from small wandering horde to great nation. In both, aggregates of different classes reach various sizes—among biological organisms, the Protozoa rarely increase beyond a microscopic size while vertebrate animals may reach an enormous size; among social organisms the primitive Tasmanian seldom form large groups, while the empires of civilization include millions of people. In both, increase by simple multiplication of units is followed by union of groups and unions of groups of groups. In both, finally, a multiplication of individuals goes on within each group of units.[7]

Differentiation of structure. And there is a second analogy between the biological and the social organism: both, as they increase in mass, become more heterogeneous in structure. In both, as we progress from smaller to larger groups the unlikeness of parts is seen to increase; so that, the larger the aggregate, the higher its organization. In both, differentiation proceeds from the more general to the more special. In both there is a community of structure among the different organs. (For example, in the biological organisms the liver and kidneys though unlike in minute structure, have each of them appliances for drafting off vitiated materials. Just so in a given society, a cotton weaving district and a seaport, though unlike in minute details of

[7] *Ibid.*, pp. 463 f.

organization, have each of them agencies for bringing in materials and other agencies for control). And finally, in both cases there is a contrast between the original mode of development and a later mode which replaces the first. (For example, in the development of the human embryo, the liver is formed without passing through all the stages of its prototypes in lower animals. Just so in a given society, an industry developing in a new locality assumes the present industrial form without passing through the historical stages of industrial evolution).[8]

Differentiation of function. As a third and last analogy between the biological and the social organism, it is to be noted that in both changes in structure are accompanied by changes in function. Where parts are little differentiated, they can perform one another's function; where they are much differentiated, they cannot. This principle, readily to be exemplified in the biological, is no less noticeable in the social organism; where, if unskilled farm laborers strike, unskilled urban workers can more or less perform their task; but where if one type of highly-trained functionary fail, no other type can replace him.[9]

From these broad biological analogies connecting the living individual and the social in bonds of close resemblance, Spencer passes to those specifically structural analogies, which suggest that a sociological form is morphologically related to a biological form of being, in much the same way as one biological form is morphologically related to another.

*Morphological analogies.* All animals and societies begin their development in like ways. In both there is a fundamental distinction between the external and internal parts. After the outer and inner systems have been marked off from one another, there arises a third system, the distributing system.[10]

The parts which carry on alimentation in the living body and the parts which carry on the productive industries in the body politic constitute the sustaining system. Alimentary structures differentiate and develop in a manner unlike that followed by regulating structures. The segments of a low type of worm

[8] *Ibid.*, pp. 471 f.
[9] *Ibid.*, pp. 485 f.
[10] *Ibid.*, pp. 491 f.

repeat one another's structures. In higher animals the various organs of the alimentary system extend through several segments. Yet the nervous centres remain in their localities. The same is true of society; industrial structures which arise in a large society formed by consolidation of small societies extend themselves without reference to political divisions. But the controlling structures do not lose their relations to the original segments. The regulating agencies of our countries continue to represent what were once independent governments.[11]

There are parallelisms between the individual and social distributing systems. In Protozoa of the rhizopod type there are no channels of communication from part to part. The same is true of low societies. In animal aggregates of which the parts assume different functions, channels for transfer develop. With societies as with living bodies, channels of communication are produced by the movements which they afterward facilitate.[12]

The regulating systems, nervo-motor in the organism and governmental-military in society, are developed into fitness for dealing with surrounding organisms—other animals to be caught or escaped from, or hostile societies to be conquered or resisted. In small and little differentiated aggregates, individual and social, the structure which coordinates does not become complex. But complexity begins in compound aggregates.[13]

So manifold are the ways in which Spencer has shown a society to be *like* a living thing, that at the conclusion of his display of the analogies connecting the two, one is almost prepared to find it proved that a society *is* a living thing; or, if the class society and the class living-being be not identical in meaning, they must at least be viewed as two species of an identical genus, *organism*, the differentiae distinguishing the social species from the biological species being rather obscure than obvious. Such, however, is far from the conclusion Spencer wishes to draw from his elaborate gathering of analogies connecting the social and the biological individual in a close likeness. If both are to be called organisms

[11] *Ibid.*, pp. 498 f.
[12] *Ibid.*, pp. 505 f.
[13] *Ibid.*, pp. 519 f.

then the differences separating the two types of organism are profound.

The first of these differences lies in the fact that the living units composing an animal are bound together in close contact; while the living units composing society are widely dispersed, the members of the social organism maintaining cooperation through intervening spaces by emotion and language. Again, in the individual organism consciousness is concentrated in a small part of the aggregate; while in the social organism it is diffused throughout the aggregate. Therefore, as there is no social sensorium, the welfare of the aggregate, considered apart from that of the units, is not an end to be sought. Society exists for the benefit of its members, not its members for the benefit of society. "It has ever to be remembered, that great as may be the efforts made for the prosperity of the body politic, yet the claims of the body politic are nothing in themselves, and become something only in so far as they embody the claims of its component individuals."[14]

Spencer goes even further than this. He makes an emphatic repudiation of the belief that there is any suggestion of an identifying analogy between the social organism and the biological organism. The social organism, "discrete instead of concrete, asymmetrical instead of symmetrical, sensitive in all its units instead of having a single sensitive centre, is not comparable to any particular type of individual organism, animal or vegetal."[15]

The social organism is not comparable to any living organism animal or vegetal. One can only conclude that if there is any sense in which the social and the biological individual are both to be called *organisms*, this sense must recognize the two as sharply contrasting, rather than closely resembling species of the common genus. But are they really to be called organisms at all? Or rather, since it is admitted on all hands that if a biological individual be not an organism then nothing is, the real question becomes, How is the class, *organism;* how are the two classes, *societies*, *living things*, to be so defined as to make of the

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[14] *Ibid.*, p. 462.
[15] *Ibid.*, p. 592.

first class a genus, under which the two latter are to be subsumed as species? And doubtless back of this lies a deeper question still, How are the two classes, *manifolds that are groups*, and *manifolds that are not;* to be defined, that we may know ourselves to be dealing with a *social group* at least, before we enquire whether or not it be an *organic group?*

The historical approach to any ultimate defining has its own code. This code discourages the dialectician from advancing more rapidly than history itself advances toward the solution of historic questions; but it encourages him to give at the end of each historic moment the clearest possible formulation to the largest question that moment seems to have raised and to have left unanswered. Generally, the most economical as well as the most profitable way of presenting the issues left open at the conclusion of an historic chapter is to propose for future consideration a series of questions; and where the object of these questions is to classify proposals that might be made with a view to definition, experience has taught the analyst a particularly convenient device for giving order and method to his questioning. It is the device generally known as "postulating".

The postulates in which we are here interested have for their object the narrowing down of the class, manifolds in general, till all manifolds have been excluded save the special class with which the postulator is prepared to identify the type of manifold he is aiming to define; namely, *social groups*. Now manifolds, like anything else, may be classified and defined in either one of two ways: they may be defined with reference to some means-end relation; or they may be defined independently of such reference. If the first alternative is accepted, the manifold is said to be defined *teleologically;* if the second, *ateleologically*. As the same alternative presents itself in defining the elements of which a manifold is to be composed, it is obvious that the following four classes exhaust all possible classes of manifold, within some one of which must lie any type to be defined.

(1) Ateleological manifolds composed of ateleological elements
(2) Ateleological manifolds composed of teleological elements

(3) Teleological manifolds composed of ateleological elements
(4) Teleological manifolds composed of teleological elements

Now one who has followed our "morphological analogist" through the thoughts of the foregoing citations, will certainly feel that both the *biological* and the *social* individuals between which Spencer would draw analogies are as far as possible kept within a class of manifolds of which the elements, *cells*, *living beings*, are teleologically defined, and of which the wholes are comparable only in terms of structure. That is, Spencer, in so far as he remains a pure morphological analogist, thinks of biological and social manifolds alike as belonging to *Class 2* of our arrangement. If then we would gradually accumulate the conditions that would distinguish from all other manifolds the *social* manifold, as the purest morphological analogist would try to conceive the *social*, we cannot begin otherwise than by imposing the first six of the following conditions upon a class of manifolds, *X;* its elements, *e;* its "world", or system to which it belongs, *S;* for it would appear that only within an *X*-class fulfilling these conditions might we look to find any class of manifolds to which the "morphologists's" description of *societies* would apply.

To be members of the *X*-class, manifolds must fulfil the conditions,

1. *X*-manifolds are *individuated* by location in space-time.
2. *X*-manifolds are *classified* in terms of structure, without reference to means-end relations; i. e., they are classified ateleologically.

(Manifolds fulfilling these conditions would be, *this square*, or *circular figure; this unicellular*, or *multicellular organism; this oligarchical*, or *monarchical State.*)

To be members of the *e*-class, elements must fulfil the conditions,

3. *e*-elements are *individuated* by location in space-time.
4. *e*-elements are *defined* in terms of (generic) end and (specific) means; i. e., they are defined teleologically.

(Elements fulfilling these conditions would be, *beings self-preservative by means of nutrition;* e. g., *living beings.*)

To be the "world" to which a given manifold and its elements are said to "belong", an *S*-system must fulfil the conditions,

5. *S*-systems furnish *frames of reference* by which their manifolds and elements may be located.
6. *S*-systems are subject to statistical laws determining in their manifolds a *probability of structural change.*

(A system fulfilling these conditions would be, *our terrestrial world*, to which are said to belong certain manifolds called *living beings*, *colonies*, *States*, with their respective elements, *cells*, *organisms*, *citizens*.)

From the class of manifolds limited by these six conditions, would be excluded many that neither Spencer nor the majority of men would consider to be *societies;* notably, all those manifolds dealt with by the ateleological sciences, mechanics, physics, chemistry—manifolds, themselves defined without reference to means-end relations, composed of elements similarly defined. But if a class of manifolds subjected to these conditions includes societies within its possibilities, does it exclude everything but such manifolds as the morphologist would consider to be *social groups?* Apparently not, unless one were to insist on what Spencer denies, that the biological individual and the social were equally social groups. But if not exclusively social, do the manifolds of our *X*-class at least form *some* class of groups; are they a kind of group to be distinguished from other kinds by some specific adjective? To answer this question, one must first undertake what is too often neglected, a definition that will hold for all sciences, of the distinction between manifolds that are *groups*, and manifolds that are *not.*

Whether the classification prove useful or not, it is evidently possible on logical grounds to make every manifold fall within one or the other of the two classes,

1. Manifolds such that element-properties are necessary and sufficient to the determination of manifold-properties.
2. Manifolds such that the element-properties are either not necessary, or not sufficient to the determination of manifold properties.

To take an example of each class (from sciences as remote as possible from those responsible for social manifolds and their groupings), consider the following cases drawn from the ateleological sciences of mechanics and physics, respectively. Let the first be a class of manifolds whose elements are "gravitating points"; and let the condition be imposed that to belong to the same class, manifolds must be identical point for point, individual manifolds being distingushed only in location. The second example shall be a class of manifolds whose elements are likewise gravitating points; but the new condition shall be imposed that to belong to the same class, manifolds need be identical only in collective mass, and in the velocity of their centre of gravity. It will be seen that to determine the manifold-property of "mechanical identity" conferred by the first classification, data as to *all* element-properties of relative position, mass, velocity, are not only sufficient but necessary. To determine the manifold-property of (a certain) "physical identity" conferred by the second classification, data as to the distribution of all these element-properties would be sufficient; they would not be necessary; the collective mass, the velocity of its centre of gravity, could be determined for each member of a class of such *physical groups* by observation of their integral behavior one toward another.

Our suggestion would be, the principle illustrated in the preceding examples can be erected into a definition, holding for all sciences, of the distinction between manifolds that are *groups*, and manifolds that are *not;* namely,

A class of *manifolds* is a class of *groups*, if and only if to the determination of manifold-properties conferred by this classification, element-properties are either unnecessary, or insufficient.

If with this definition in mind we return to the $X$-class as so far conditioned, we may expect to find within this class of manifolds many that are groups: some physical, some biological, some social, and some, it may be, that are all three. Certainly, it would seem consistent with all that Spencer has said on the subjects of biology and sociology to suppose him to accept the following proposition; namely,

All that has been said respecting

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| *e*-elements | $X$-manifolds, | $S$-systems, |

would be true if said of

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| *man*-elements | some *man*-manifolds | *our* world-system |

and equally true if said of

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| *cell*-elements | some *cell*-manifolds | *our* world-system |

For example, *man*-manifolds of which all our statements would seem to hold, would be such as are individuated by location in space-time (men of first-century Rome, of seventh-century Arabia, etc.), and classified in terms of institutions (monogamous cultures, polygamous cultures, etc.).

*Cell*-manifolds of which all our statements would seem equally to hold, would be such as are individuated by location in space-time (cells of "this" worm; of Socrates, etc.) and classified in terms of structure (invertebrates, vertebrates, etc.).

If these propositions are accepted, the $X$-class defined by our postulates will certainly contain social individuals and biological individuals; and not only is every member of these classes itself a physical group (having weight, temperature, etc., as integral properties), but it is difficult to suppose that any individual classed with these could fail to be some kind of physical group. Have we then assured ourselves that the $X$-class is not only a class of manifolds, but a class of groups; so that if *societies* should prove to be a species of this class of manifolds, a society will have been proved to be some species of group? Far from it; the $X$-class is doubtless a class every member of which is member of *some* class of groups; the class of $X$-manifolds is not therefore shown to be a class of $X$-groups. Nor can it be shown to be, or not to be a class of $X$-groups, until some information is furnished as to the data in terms of which the manifold-properties so far conferred on the manifolds by virtue of their classifications under Post. 2 and Post. 6 are supposed to be determined.

The properties conferred under Post. 2 are structural; those conferred under Post. 4 are probabilities; namely, probabilities of structural change. But as the structural properties are generic to all manifolds conditioned by Postulates 1 and 2 alone, they are only common to, not restricted to, the final $X$-class, limited as it

is to those manifolds which fulfil not only the first two, but also the subsequent four postulates of our listing. Evidently, to show our class of $X$-manifolds to be a class of $X$-groups, it is necessary to show that the specific manifold-properties conferred on them by their $X$-classification stand related to the element-properties conferred by the same classification, in the way required by our formal definition of *groups*. Can either this or its opposite be demonstrated on the basis of the postulates so far formulated? Of course *not;* for nothing whatever has been said as to the variables of which the manifold-property, probability of structural change, is a function.

We have then nothing to show whether these manifold-properties are or are not determined by the element-properties accorded the elements of our description. From this, two things important to any systematic method of sociological defining are at once evident. First, any system setting out from manifolds of our second class to define manifolds called social-groups, must begin by formulating the six postulates already listed; and must end by formulating more. Second, the additional postulates must always include one or more establishing the variables of which the postulator assumes probability-of-change-of-social-structure to be a function. We may expect the decision of this point to be the point of divergency of those sociological schools that have their common beginning in the acceptance of Postulates 1 to 6.

From these first six postulates, would be consistently developed either of two sociologies: the one would conceive the manifold-property, probability-of-structural-change, to be subject to none but ateleological law, to be function of no variables implying a means-end-relation; the other, would conceive both law and variables to be teleological in form. The first, then, would so complete its definition of *society* as to keep the social manifold within the second of our four classes; i. e., *society*, although composed of teleological elements, would remain a manifold *ateleologically* defined. The second would in the end discover its social manifold to belong to the fourth of our classes; the properties distinguishing its *society* would come to be *teleologically* defined. The first suggests the conceptions of a morpholo-

gist; the second, of a physiologist. To which of the developments will Spencer incline?

If Spencer were as pure in his "morphology" as he is famous for his "morphological analogies", he must have confined his societies to manifolds of our second class; he must have made probabilities of structural change depend upon ateleological variables and subject to ateleological laws. The beginnings of such a procedure are there, the end (we have already suggested) is elsewhere. We have seen how in life and society *alike*, differentiation of structure must come with growth, and growth must come with *age*. But *age* (together with such physical conditions as would be considered with it in calculating probable changes of structure) is of the dimension *time*, an essentially ateleological term; and so would any laws making probability of structural change a function of *age*, be independent of calculations of means-to-end. Had Spencer continued in these ways to the completion of his conceptions of social and biological individuals, both his biology and his sociology would have been consistently morphological; and his sociology, at least, would have dealt with none but manifolds of *Class 2*. But there soon appears a third analogy drawing biological and sociological classes still closer together; there is, in both, a progressive differentiation of function. One cannot deal with functional classes within the limits of ateleological principles of classification; and Spencer, perhaps unwillingly, verges from morphology toward physiology, with what implications of new manifold-properties we shall presently see.

Meanwhile, there are those whose conceptions of human society remain faithful to the idea of social manifolds as manifolds of our *second* class. Their societies are composed of teleological elements, indeed, but are characterized by institutions whose destiny to change is as "fatal" as the ageing and dying of all that ever lived. One need only recall the transformations through which Spengler, in his *Untergang des Abendlandes* follows all the "cultures" of history, to imagine the development of a sociology whose probabilities of social and biological change alike are determined by the changeless and purposeless laws of *ageing*. The biology and sociology of such a system would be of the

purest morphological model; they would leave both types of ageing manifold within the class we have called, *the second.*

But as for Spencer himself, his biology and sociology alike become more and more physiological; and as a first step, his biological and social manifolds come to be defined by a new manifold-property; it is the property of *adaptability.* And therewith, both manifolds are transferred from the *second* to the *fourth* of our classes, that in which the manifolds, still composed of teleological elements, are also themselves teleologically defined. For *adaptability* is one of those terms generally recognized to be definable only by the methods of teleology; i. e., to be indefinable, save by reference to a means-end relation of some kind. It will give definiteness to what follows, and probably save time in the end, if before treating of *adaptability* as a property, we formulate those few principles of general teleology on which our further defining must depend.

Among the principles of teleological defining we take to be fundamental, are the following:

Within a system $S$, if $x$ be a class teleologically defined, then,

(i) members of the $x$-class will have been found *sometimes but not always* to produce members of a certain $z$-class; i.e., every $x$ will be *potential producer of a z;* and,

(ii) these potential *z-producers* will have been found to fall into two species, *x-producers-of-y*, *x-producers-of-non-y*, such that a member of the first is *more likely* than a member of the second to produce a $z$; i. e., for members of the class, *x-potential-producer-z*, the production of a $y$ is a *means to the end of x-producing.*

Classes defined exclusively in terms of generic ends and specific means are said to be *teleologically defined;* the properties conferred on members of a class by teleological classification are said to be *teleological properties.*

In light of these general principles of teleological defining, it will perhaps be seen that one can meaningfully propose so to use language that the following propositions will all be meaningful, and will all mean the same thing:

"The probability of a given structural change is dependent
(a) on the measure to which the change would *enhance the probability* of a potential-producer's attainment; or
(b) on the *advantage* of the change to a potential producer; or
(c) on a potential producer's *interest* in the change.

Undertaking to conform our use of terms to these preliminary understandings, we may conveniently employ the foregoing equivalent expressions to formulate and discuss new conditions to which an $X$-class must conform, if within this class a *social-group* is to be found.

7. $X$-manifolds possess structures, the probability of whose change is a direct function of the advantage of the change to some potential producer; i. e., $X$-manifolds have the property of *structural adaptability*.

8. $X$-manifolds possess a structural adaptability that is a direct function of element-interests.

It has already been shown in what connection *Post. 7* is demanded by a sociology that would exclude from *societies* all manifolds whose probabilities of change were functions of no interests whatever. *Post. 8*, if accepted, will confine the further search for *societies* to a class of manifolds whose probabilities-of-change are not only interest-consulting (as by definition are all adaptabilities) but specifically consultant of element-interests. We may assume to be well within the sympathies of Spencer a theory that would exclude from any class within which either *living beings* or *societies* could lie, such manifolds as might be called *absolute tyrannies;* that is, manifolds whose probable adaptations were exclusively in the interest of a producer *other than* any element of the manifold adapted. Few however would be willing to admit that this last condition excluded all biological individuals from the class to which it applied. Often as the organism seems to use its organs as its implements, there is old and sound tradition in favor of the view that an organism must always show *some* regard for its organs. And *some* (not *exclusive*) regard for member-interests is all the last postulate demands of the adapter responsible for the adaptations defining the class of manifolds it still permits.

If we suppose an $X$-class fulfilling all the conditions so far postulated, to be a class *without* which societies cannot lie, yet a class *within* which not only social but also biological manifolds may be included, the definer of *social groups* has further steps to take. Meanwhile, we may at once make sure of one point of interest to the postulator's further procedure: by imposing on all manifolds that can be called *social* the condition of *Post. 8*, he has permanently robbed these manifolds of one of their only two chances of qualifying as *groups*. To whatever class a manifold may belong, to qualify as a group its definition must accord it properties such that to the determination of these manifold-properties, element-properties prove either unnecessary or insufficient (see p. 30). But if the effect of *Post. 7* was to restrict the *essential* attributes (properties) of manifolds of the $X$-class to *adaptabilities*, that of *Post. 8* was to restrict these adaptabilities to such as were functions of element-properties (interests). Evidently, under these conditions, to the determination of manifold-properties, element-properties are indispensable; so that, if any manifold falling under these conditions is to be a group, it can only be so because the further conditioning of its class implies that the element-properties necessary to the determination of its manifold-properties are nevertheless insufficient to this determination.

It would be easy to add to the eight conditions imposed on that $X$-class, within which social manifolds are supposed to lie, a *ninth*, that would in all appearance have the following effects: first, it would exclude from the resultant $X$-class all *biological* manifolds; second, it would include at least one manifold sometimes considered to be *social*. This postulate would take the form,

9. The structural adaptability of $X$-manifolds is dependent on element-interests alone.

It would be difficult to maintain that the only structural adaptations likely to take place in a biological organism are such as are well-calculated to serve the interest of its constituent cells; on the other hand, it would be difficult to deny to "our world" the possibility of a "cooperative society"; i. e., a society the *probability* of whose adaptive changes would be based solely on considerations of member-interest. If then, we chose to identify social manifolds with the class of manifolds fulfilling *all nine* of

these conditions imposed on a hypothetical "X-class", the class of manifolds thus defined would contain no biological individuals; and would contain at least one social individual (individuated in the sense required by *Post. 1*); namely, the society sometimes conceived to be "the perfect society." But, if this definition of *social manifold* were accepted, it would have for a corollary the proposition, No social manifold is a social group. And as social groupings are by definition confined to such manifolds as are essentially social, the conclusion would be that of the extreme individualist, The class, *social group*, is a nul class.

Such a final postulate and definition as has just been examined would indeed settle all questions that without it must be left undecided; but would it settle them in a sense acceptable to Spencerian theory? Does Spencer mean to make the two classes of manifold, *biological individual*, *social individual*, mutually exclusive? Does he mean to deny that there is such a thing as a social group? In favor of an affirmative answer to the first question could be cited such passages as that in which Spencer insists that a social organism "is not comparable to any particular type of individual (biological) organism, animal or vegetal." In favor of an affirmative answer to the second, is a statement that suggests the best reason Spencer has anywhere offered in support of the first: Society exists for the benefit of its members, not its members for the benefit of Society; "it has ever to be remembered, that great as may be the efforts made for the prosperity of the body politic, yet the claims of the body politic are nothing in themselves, and become something only in so far as they embody the claims of its component individuals."[16]

And yet, one may hesitate to regard these somewhat loose statements as forcing on Spencer the acceptance of the suggested definition of social manifolds, with its implication of the nonexistence of social groups. Spencer or another might maintain the first statement to imply no more than that the two classes, *biological manifold*, *social manifold*, must never be made identical; i. e., definition must always leave room for societies that are not living beings; for living beings that are not societies. This

[16] *Principles of Sociology*, Vol. I, p. 462.

premise would not exclude the possibility that a given individual might be simultaneously member of a physical, a biological, a social manifold; it would merely insist that the three classes, though they be allowed *some*, cannot be allowed *all* members in common. Again Spencer or another might interpret the second statement to mean no more than that a *perfect* social manifold would be such a cooperative society as would have outlived those conditions which have made historical societies into social groups; i. e., societies whose probable adaptations are not calculated to be for the benefit of its members, but rather in the interest of some potential producer of structural change not a member of the society.

No doubt but that in the writings of Spencer himself, in the works of those who, like von Lilienfeld, Schaffle, Worms, follow closely in his footsteps, would be found endless material in whose implications might lie plausible answers to the questions here left open. But, as has been said, the interest of historical review to a searcher for ultimate definition does not lie in completing an estimate of historic contributions; it lies in letting history suggest the questions to which attention has been given, with a view to exhausting the logical possibilities in the way of answer. Thus, at the present juncture, it will be seen that even to one who has accepted the first *eight* of our conditions distinguishing social manifolds from non-social, there lies a broad logical alternative to the admission of the *ninth* suggestion. To the hypothesis that in a given class of manifolds, *all* properties of structural adaptability are dependent on element-interests alone, the logical contradictory is of course, *some* properties of structural adaptability are *not* dependent on element-interests alone. And obviously, this broadest alternative is further to be divided into a number of contingencies, each one of which must find discussion somewhere within the limits of a sociology. But these alternative possibilities in the way of defining *social groups*, arise only after the acceptance of the *eighth* of our postulates; a postulate whose admission has already carried the postulator beyond the notions of a "morphology". Leaving it to history to suggest as many of these lines of inquiry as may be found illustrated in literature, we may reserve for a final chapter our own reflections on the whole progress of historical dialectic.

Meanwhile, by way of planning our progress, it is advisable to turn back to that point at which a preliminary classification of manifolds and elements showed a choice between social theories differing in the very first postulates with which they would condition the class of manifolds within which *social* manifolds might be supposed to lie. The morphological analogists furnish the best illustration of a theory which starts, at least, to consider social manifolds as of the *Class 2* of our preliminary analysis; namely, "ateleological manifolds composed of teleological elements". Such would be manifolds of living beings, classified in terms of their structures, describable without reference to function. It may well be that no morphological analogist escapes in the end from functional implications in his description of the structural properties in terms of which he tries to classify manifolds; but it is at least fairly sure that if the "morphologist" cannot succeed in keeping his manifolds within *Class 2*, no other sociologist will have better success in this direction. But there could be no profit in searching out the *implicit* deviations of morphologists, when history furnishes plentiful examples of *explicit* departures from the morphological plan of seeking social manifolds within the *Class 2* of our preliminary survey. It is an historic accident of course that makes us take up next in order the sociologies whose first postulates limit the manifolds among which the social are to be sought to those of *Class 1* of our list; namely, "Ateological manifolds composed of ateological elements."

Of such sociologies, a fair illustration is furnished in the thought of the "physiological analogists" to which we turn in the next chapter. In the first example at least, we have a particular response to a motive which, were there time, might be shown to have operated all through history, in all sorts of contexts. It is the feeling that any science of living things, their species, their societies, must fail, if its characterizations of these live things confine themselves to the passive categories of structure (e. g., anatomy). To give the quality of *life* to a manifold, it is necessary to treat it and its constituents in terms of the active categories of motion, force, energy. And, as we shall see, there are those who, convinced of this necessity, are no less

convinced of the sufficiency of "dynamism" to supplement the deficiencies of "mechanism" in conferring *life* on *structure.* Quite without recourse to the troublesome categories of teleology, they would present a picture of living (including social) phenomena in terms of "physiological activity". Evidently, a theory that would avoid all teleological terms in describing either manifold or element must at the very outset confine its search for both the biological and the social individual to such manifolds as, themselves ateologically defined, may be composed of elements no less ateological; that is, the theory must find its objects within the *first* of our four classes of manifold-element conditions.

## III

### The Analogists: Physiological

"Twenty years ago," writes Professor Wheeler in his study "The Ant Colony as an Organism,"[1] "we were captivated by the morphology of the organism; now its behavior occupies the foreground of our attention. Once we thought we were seriously studying biology when we were scrutinizing paraffine sections of animals and plants or dried specimens mounted on pins or pressed between layers of blotting paper; now we are sure that we were studying merely the exuviae of organisms, the effete residua of the life process. . . . It is certain that whatever changes may overtake biology in the future, we must henceforth grapple with the organism as a dynamic agency acting in a very complex and unstable environment."

As a result of this change of viewpoint among biologists, sociologists who traced analogies between the individual and the social organism began to emphasize the "behavior" of society. Professor Child, who seems to be favorably known among biologists, lays down the principle that whatever the anatomist may tell us concerning the constitution of the human body, each human body is a living individual only because its behavior proves it to be one.[2] Having characterized the *organic individual* as fundamentally neither a structural system nor a system of chemical reactions but rather a system of relations between a physical substratum, or structure, and chemical reactions, he considers the term so defined to be applicable not only to the *biological* but to the *social* individual.

In a paper[3] given before the American Sociological Society a few years ago, Child traced, with his definition of an organism as a basis, analogies between the organism and a society. The processes of physiological integration within the human being suggest the the processes of social integration among human

[1] *Journal of Morphology*, Vol. 23, p. 307.
[2] *Individuality in Organisms*, p. 2.
[3] *Publications of the American Sociological Society*, Vol. 22, pp. 26–42.

beings. Since physiological processes of integration make orderly wholes; and since social integrations represent the highest development of integrative processes among living units, he feels that a consideration of the question whether or not they have any relation to the simpler physiological integrative processes may be of some interest to the sociologist.

Child first gives his description of the organism. In the past biology has been so largely concerned with learning about the structure of living things and the functions of their different organs that it gave little attention to the problem of the unity and order which makes the organism what it is. It either ignored this unity and order, took it for granted, or translated it into some sort of pre-established harmony. This unity and order exists; and its nature may be shown by experiment. In simpler organisms it is possible to separate parts from each other without killing or injuring them and then to determine their reactions when separated. It is also possible to put the parts together differently, to inhibit the activity of certain parts without affecting others, to stimulate certain parts and then to observe the changes. These experiments, says Child (he has been performing them over a long period of years) have established the fundamental importance of physiological correlation—the physiological relations between parts—for the unity and wholeness of the organism.

From this description of the most general phenomena to be called organic, Child passes to a more special discussion of physiological correlation. This includes two groups of factors: the *transmissive relation*, or the process of communication between parts by means of mental activity, and the *transportative relation*, or the exchange in mass of substance from the part producing them to other parts. The organism is not a mosaic of independent parts, but consists in the parts plus all the relations between them. The unity consists in the relations rather than in the parts.

These physiological relations between parts undergo various changes in the course of individual development and evolution. In the simplest organisms the surface may become the interior, or the interior may become the surface, due to environment.

Here the pattern is a behavior pattern, representing the behavior of a particular kind of protoplasm under certain environmental conditions. Besides this surface-interior pattern, the less simple organisms show an axiate pattern possessing physiological polarity and symmetry. Polarity and symmetry are expressions in the mass of protoplasm which constitute the organism of orderly arrangements referable to certain so called axes passing in certain directions in the body. Along the polar, or major, axis the major order arises; along the axes of symmetry, or minor axes, the secondary order arises.

Polarity and symmetry seem to be expressions of the dynamics of life rather than expressions of static molecular structure. The processes of living are going on most rapidly at one end of such an axis and from this end their rate decreases along the axis. These differences in the rate of living at different levels determine the formation of different organs. The head and brain develop from the most active region of the polar axis and the regions of the central nervous system posterior to the head form the most active regions of the axis of symmetry. Other organs arise in definite order along the axes and the order and arrangement of organs depend on the quantitative difference along the axes; but the kinds of organs which develop in a particular case depend on the *hereditary constitution* of the protoplasm concerned. The differential seems to arise as a reaction of the protoplasm to a differential in its environment. In simpler animals you can obliterate previously existing axiate patterns; determine new ones in other directions; and make the individual over through the action of external energies on the protoplasm.

The organismic pattern, then, originates as a record of experience; and Child explains the way in which this quantitative differential in physiological condition brings about integration and determines the wholeness of the organism. If we apply external energies to a region, the activity spreads to adjoining regions and decreases with the distance from the point of origin. The relation between a more active and a less active region appears to be the foundation of physiological dominance or control. The dominant region represents a government, and only the simplest sort of integration is possible without leadership.

The unity and order are not preestablished in the protoplasmic constitution but develop out of protoplasmic behavior.

Integration develops, therefore, by the axiate organism in its simplest form beginning as an autocracy, a government by a ruling class. The dominant region determines the behavior of other parts, but is independent of them as regards the development of its general structural pattern. The organism as a whole is comparable to a great-nation state, but with relatively rigid class distinctions. Between the different classes complex commercial relations have also arisen in the form of the transport of nutrition, oxygen, and waste products, of internal secretions, so called hormones, etc. These also play a part in the further differentiation of the various organs.

So far, Child's conclusion would come to this. The organism represents a behavior pattern in the cell or cell-mass of which it consists. Physiological integration is not an autonomous process but originates through relation and reaction to environment. The organism appears to be the expression of an integrating and ordering institution which originates in the most general relations and reactions of living protoplasms to environment. The organism is inconceivable except in relation to environment, and that means that it is inconceivable except in terms of behavior. Integration is not the mere aggregation of units, but rather the development of definite relations between them. The relations, not the parts, are the real integrating factors. The organism is not merely the sum of its cells or its organs, but of these plus all the physiological relations between them; and to the biologist the same appears to be true of human society.

To the biologist the analogy between the biological individual and the social individual seems complete. A cell as a part of an organism behaves differently and is different in some way from the cell isolated. The biologist finds it difficult to believe that the individual human being as a member of a social group, is the same as that human being isolated from the group. In both the biological and the social individual, the primary factors in integration appear to be the transmissive rather than the transportative relations, (i. e., the processes of communication rather than those of material or commercial exchange). Communica-

tion does not require special organs of transmission, but may take place through various physical media; whether it be effected through living protoplasm or through some other medium is unimportant to the result. In biological organization all that seems necessary for the beginning of orderly integration in protoplasm is a quantitative difference in rate of living, and the possibility of communication. In social organization, dominance or leadership in its most general physiological form apparently originates in the more rapid liberation of energy. The personal leader among men may not always have a higher metabolism and liberate energy more rapidly than those he leads, but in consequence either of his relation to the particular situation or his heredity or past experience, he reacts to the situation in such a way as to develop an integrating force, usually psychological rather than physical. In this interpretation, Child introduces no element of vitalism; his "integrating force" is caused either by external circumstances, or heredity, or past experience. It is true that in the course of social development we see leadership becoming impersonal and institutional, but in all cases the dominant conception is the one most effective in determining the integrative behavior of different individuals with reference to a particular situation. So that the history of this social development from its beginnings in the simplest living being to its highest expression in human societies is a continuous story. For social integration appears first as the behavior of living protoplasm; and the evidence seems to show the behavior which integrates the individual organism into an orderly and definite whole to be continuous with that which integrates a nation, a church, or other social group.

As the concluding paragraph of the last chapter will have led one to expect, the distinction between a Spencer and a Child proves to be far deeper than any mere difference between a relatively static (morphological) and a relatively dynamic (physiological) method of approaching a problem on the meaning of whose basic terms both methods are agreed. If Spencer and Child were of one mind on the meaning of life in the biologist's sense, and merely approached by different methods of comparison

the question, How *like* is a society of biological lives to any one of the lives composing it? we might find such postulates as would formulate the difference of their answers without having to reconsider all those which set forth the implications of Spencerian thought. But the two do not agree on this matter of fundamental meanings: Spencer's biology is based on functional conceptions, Child's on mechanistic; Spencer's definition of life requires the word "adjustment;" Child's apparently would avoid all teleological terms, and would restrict itself to such ateleological concepts as "energies" of different quantity and distribution. Now, the more fundamental the postulates on which two modern thinkers differ, the further back in history lies the moment at which their respective *schools* of thought begin to diverge. To find a significant point at which modern teleology and modern ateleology begin to formulate their differences, one need not transcend the limits of fairly modern tradition; but one must, before one has finished, return to that seventeenth century from which proceeded so many differentiations of thought. However, there is advantage in making this retrogression slowly; for there are questions one may frame at once, whose answers, or rather the differing methods of whose answering, lead one back, step by step, to the split of biological schools of which the century of Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibnitz was witness.

The question that occurs to one as immediately critical to an interpretation of Child's communication to the sociologists, may be put in the form of an example.

Suppose that on board a ship at sea, there was ascertained to be no living thing save the hundred members of a crew, together with any such other lives as these lives might compose, or as might compose them. We assume that if anything is to be called a society, a social individual, a ship's crew is to be so called; it is one of the most highly "organized" and "unified" associations of men to be found anywhere. Query: Under the conditions stated, how many biological individuals are there aboard that ship?

Let us suppose a reader to have found in the last paragraph of our physiologist's writing, the implication that there must be at least one hundred one biological individuals aboard our vessel;

namely, one hundred of the genus "animal", species "human," and one of the genus "social", species "nautical". Let us further suppose the same reader to have gathered from the same paragraph, as summary of what went before, a second implication; namely, that counting a hundred thousand cells to each sailor, there must be at least ten million biological specimens aboard the ship; for is not each cell itself a living being? Whether or not Child would accept the answers we have put into the mouth of his hypothetical reader makes very little difference. If they are not his answers, then his discussion in terms of energies, unspecified "relations", "continuities of protoplasm" is too vague to allow us to see why they should not be his. They are in any case historic enough; and down to the very qualifying term, "at least", represent the views of a doctrine popular in the last century; one that sometimes called itself "polyzoism".

There is, then, an historic opinion that would solve the whole problem of living groups and social groups by accepting a sweeping formula: Every social group is a (relatively complex) biological individual; every biological individual is a (relatively simple) social group. At least, the proponents of this simplifying theory would accept without reserve the formula stated, for all cases of life and society save certain "limiting cases." There must be such limiting cases, and these cases must require critical consideration; for if there is a life too elementary to be a group of lives, and if there is a cosmic aggregate too vast to be a group-life, the formula does not hold without exception. Here indeed are two questions; but historically speaking, the answer given to the second is generally found to depend on the motives determining an answer to the first; so that as genetic historians we need consider only the origin of certain contradictory doctrines concerning the *lower* limit of life.

Here, there are indeed only two possibilities: either, life is always a group of lives, down to the mathematical point (which need not even be reserved as an exception, but treated in mathematical way as a "group of itself"); or, there is a most elementary life which is a group of non-living points whose only attributes are such as may be defined by mechanics. Both of

these doctrines develop out of the seventeenth century system of Descartes; the one by accepting the one, the other by accepting the other of the only two possibilities presenting themselves as ways of simplifying the Cartesian "image of nature." For Descartes had left this image in a condition one may well call "mixed"; the points of which it was composed had, some of them, only mechanical attributes; others ("soul-points") only teleological attributes. To resolve this dualism into a simpler monism, there were but two ways: either with Spinoza, to eliminate all teleological points, leaving nature an unbroken mechanism; or with Leibnitz, to eliminate all the mechanical points, leaving nature a living thing or at least a congeries of lives (to be accurate, of points called "monads", whose only attributes were "appetite" and "perception".)

From either of these beginnings, the composition of elementary points into lives, societies, a cosmos, may be controlled by ideals of "continuity"; but it is evident that no "continuity" our physiologist, Child, could have had in mind would derive from the radically teleological conceptions of a Leibnitz. They belong then to some form of doctrine that has accepted the mechanical postulate of Spinoza. Now, what the logic of classification would suggest, history confirms; those who have accepted the Spinozistic postulate of "nature as unbroken mechanism", themselves fall into two schools. The dividing question is, as to whether science should or should not regard teleologically-defined terms as indispensable to the description and explanation of Nature's phenomena. That a teleology consistent with the hypothesis of Nature's unbroken mechanism is not only possible, but indispensable to science (e. g. biological, psychological, sociological sciences) is probably the view of Spinoza himself; it is certainly that of Kant. That no teleology consistent with inviolable mechanism is possible, is the fundamental assumption of all the older *materialists*, whose more recent heirs prefer to call themselves *mechanists*. From Hobbes and Gassendi of Descartes' own time, through the more "mechanical" materialists of the eighteenth century (La Mettrie, Holbach), through the more "physiological" materialists of the nineteenth century (Vogt, Büchner) the tradition descends in unbroken line to the

"mechanists" of our day. In the conceptions of Child, we find these historic motives resulting in an attempt to construct both biological and social groups out of manifolds and elements restricted to the *first* of the four classes distinguished in our preliminary survey (p. 27); it is a materialistic attempt to define *life* and *society* in terms of ateleological manifolds composed of ateleological elements.

It has seemed worth while to trace the history of modern attempts of this kind, in order to show the motive common to them all. It is the only motive likely to encourage similar attempts in the future; it is the *tacit* motive one divines to have inspired those classic atomists (Democritus, Epicurus, Lucretius) from whom Descartes himself derives. Our own estimate of the value of such attempts is based upon a theory of their original motivation; namely, that all materialist philosophy begins with a sound scientific postulate; from this postulate it hastens to draw an unsound inference. Postulate and inference may be formulated as follows:

Mechanical postulate: Nothing can be supposed to exist in Nature whose existence there would imply a violation of mechanical law.

Mechanist inference: No class of beings, save a class susceptible of mechanical definition, can be supposed to exist in Nature, without implying a violation of Nature's mechanism.

The reasons that lead the present study to regard this inference as invalid are of course too long to reproduce here; they must be sought in a theory of teleology this study is forced to presuppose. It is enough to point out that with the validity of the "mechanist inference" all motive for mechanistic biology, psychology, sociology, disappears; and with this motive for attempting the impossible, disappears all motive for reviewing the history of the attempt's successive failures. To all who assume that (1) a social manifold is essentially a manifold of elements called *living*, (2) that the class living-being is susceptible of definition in none but teleological terms, the history of efforts to construct a social-group that shall be an ateleological manifold of atelelogical elements must be without profit. And therewith we may dismiss from further consideration the possibility of

finding social groups among manifolds of our *Class 1;* namely, ateleological manifolds composed of ateleological elements. That there are such things as ateleological groups, we are far from denying: the science of *physics* deals with no other. But such groups can be neither biological, nor social individuals.

Meanwhile, that a mechanist should have seized on the adjective "physiological" to distinguish a relatively "dynamic" from a relatively "static" treatment of certain problems, does not make *physiology* into a *physical* (ateleological) science. It remains, along with the *life* it studies, a science that could not advance a step without introducing terms implying reference to *function*, and to the *means-end* relation. It remains, that is, what it has been in all save mechanistic tradition, a branch of the teleological science of biology. There is, then, no reason why we should not, but every reason why we should, consider in this chapter on the "physiological analogists", certain recent attempts to construct social-groups as specially conditioned cases of *teleological manifolds* constituted of *teleological elements*. That is, we may examine certain conceptions of society as a manifold of the *fourth* of the four classes distinguished in our preliminary classification. (p. 28).

When Sumner and Keller, in their recent four-volume work, *The Science of Society*, define society, they base their definition "squarely upon the well-known facts of all organic life."[4] For them, a human society is "a group of human beings living in a co-operative effort to win subsistence and to perpetuate the species."[5] Such a social group is taken to be an organism for no other reason than that it is observed to discharge the usual functions of organic groups. "Indeed", they continue, "our starting points are located so close to the organic range that we have but to omit the word 'human' from this definition in order to have a definition of any non-human society: for instance, a swarm of bees. It needs no comment to demonstrate the objective quality of a conception of society which locks immediately with facts observable in nature. At the same time our

[4] *The Science of Society*, Vol. I, p. 7.
[5] *Ibid.*, pp. 6, 7.

definition obviously excludes not a few forms of human association from the title of society: a club, for example, or a lodge, or a political party, or a trade union, or a monastery, or a college . . . It is indispensable for our definition that there shall exist cooperative activities in self-maintenance and self-perpetuation."[6] According to their definition a family, a nation, or "even the whole race of mankind" are societies. To be a society, therefore, there must be present organization for the purpose of maintaining and perpetuating life. The elements of this organization are differentiation of function, adaptation, perfection, cooperation, and rhythmic effort under command and discipline. The organization restrains the individuals to a common purpose, and, while hostile to liberty, gives aid and protection and is the sustaining structure within which individual life goes on in security. They admit that the societal organization dominates us and constrains us to make concessions of our liberty of unrestricted action. Society makes us pay for whatever benefits it confers. It is not a great club, enjoying privileges and advantages by nature with free membership for everybody. It has high admission fees and strict rules of general welfare. It imposes heavy penalties on dissenters and confers no privileges except a costly insurance against certain massive ills. Yet man is content because he realizes that the benefits of association are worth the cost. "Association was a species of insurance which one could not afford to be without. It was not, however, conferred upon the beneficiary without cost: the premiums of the policy were the sacrifices made."[7]

Our authors, however, feel that the advantages outweigh the drawbacks. The function of life in society is the reduction of the risk element in life to a constant, the substitution of a small, recurring, calculable loss for a possible ruinous and incalculable one. "Association is a decisive advantage in the struggle for existence."[8] Cooperation is antagonistic in nature. "It is out of antagonistic cooperation that societal harmonies arise. Two parties which are competitors, with primarily diverse and

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 7.
[7] *Ibid.*, p. 14.
[8] *Ibid.*, p. 21.

antagonistic interests, and consequently with mental or emotional hostility one to another in their hearts, set aside their differences and unite for the sake of satisfying, by joint effort, some preponderating interest which they have in common."[9] The combination of laborers and capitalists at the top of the capitalistic civilization is a case of antagonistic cooperation. It is astonishing to to see the emergence of cooperation effort between organisms, which though strange and hostile, sink their differences for joint advantages. "In a sense all cooperation is antagonistic, for none is possible without the sinking of individual differences in interest."[10]

Practically the whole of *The Science of Society* is devoted to a thorough analysis of institutions which have been formed about the nuclei of the "basic, permanent, and engrossing interests" of man. These interests: the hunger interest, the love interest, the gratification interest, and the fear interest, give rise to, first, the institutions of self-maintenance, including the industrial organization, property, the regulative organization and religion; second, the institutions of self-perpetuation, including marriage and the family; and third, the institutions of self-gratification, including a variety of social forms.[11] In the analysis of these institutions, we are presented with an elaborate and detailed description of individuals in primitive and advanced societies carrying on activities which are necessary to maintain and perpetuate these individuals in their struggle against their environments. In no case, are we shown any instances of society regularly maintaining itself at an unnecessary and avoidable expense of member-interests. Sumner and Keller would say, without reservations, one may suppose, that in the long run, the interests of the individual are the interests of society. Inasmuch as all the ends of the individual are attained in and through the societal organization, it would seem that individuals and society must have harmonious interests.

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[9] *Op. cit.*, Vol. 3, p. 2234.
[10] *Ibid.*, p. 2235.
[11] *Op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 92.

We are in the presence of a sliding adjustment between the two types of interest. The omnipotence of the group and the anarchistic liberty of the individual are the two poles between which the societal constitution has varied ever since there was any sort of association at all, entrance into which meant sacrifice of personal liberty. The healthful adjustment of the two elements is set at any time by the life-conditions of the group . . . Because these life-conditions change, the adjustment is always unstable and readjustment is perennially called for by the voice of discontent. The expedient policy is clear enough along general lines, however difficult in its specific applications; its guiding principles are two: to grant freedom of activity in the pursuit of self selected ends; and to secure discipline to regulate the relations of these efforts, on the part of different individuals, to one another in the interest of peace and harmony.[12]

In spite of the presence of antagonism, society is, in the eyes of Sumner and Keller, a cooperative form of association. The individual gains more than he loses by cooperating with his fellowmen in the war against the forces of nature. How then can society be something over and above its members? The answer to this question is given in the following way.

Fifty men working in cooperation can do things that the same fifty men acting separately cannot; they can pull, one at a time, at a rope attached to a heavy weight, and the latter does not move; they pull no harder, but at the same time, with someone to mark rhythm for them, and the shift is made. Herein lies the paradox that a society is greater than the sum of its parts. The extra power is due to organization.[13]

But this is merely a mechanical unity, a special case of the *kind* of addition, called "composition of forces." It is no more than saying "in union there is strength." A bundle of sticks, i. e., a number "taken collectively," is much more difficult to break than the same number "taken distributively." There is then no reason whatever why Sumner and Keller should take themselves to have verified a statement they quote from the jurists, Pollack and Maitland:

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[12] *Op. cit.*, Vol. III, p. 2233.
[13] *Op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 14, 15.

It is a subtle and mysterious fact that a collective body of human beings manifests a life of its own which is something else than the sum of the lives of its members. Artificial social creations, such as corporations, have the same character. A society shows this phenomenon more strongly than any other collective body.[14]

And nowhere in the sequel do our authors depart from this view of society which finds the explanation for all forms of social union to be the one principle of human experience, that to each element in such a union the cooperation of his fellows is worth what it costs. They are content to show how such cooperation works in forming the institutions of society. The members of the community show differences of capacity, taste, and desire. These give rise to differences of function in the work of the community. Then mutual services, rights, and obligations appear. The functions support and supplement one another, so that the community as a whole, by carrying on a combined assault upon nature, wins more for each of its constituent members than any of these constituents could win for himself in lonely freedom. And their argument concludes with these words.

Human society then, by the diversity of its parts, their specialization, the distribution of functions, the mutual service and support of the parts, and their solidarity, is a true system or organization. It has a life different from that of the individual and not simply aggregated or multiplied from the life of individuals. The quality of a combination is not the sum of the qualities of its components; no one could predict the characteristics of gunpowder from those of sulphur, charcoal, and saltpeter. One cannot juxtapose cells and judge what they will make. Similarly the juxtaposition of human qualities does not guarantee the quality of a society. The development of histology does not render physiology less indispensable. There is a body to study as well as a cell, a society as well as an individual; and the body and the society are things with lives and laws of their own.[15]

It will be seen at once in what respects the foregoing account of a social manifold lends itself to classification as "physiological," in contrast with the more "morphological" conceptions reviewed

[14] *Ibid.*, p. 15.
[15] *Op. cit.*, Vol. III, p. 2220.

in Chapter II. In the first place, the social individual is definitely presented as a member of a teleologically-defined class, the class of manifolds whose generic purpose is, "to win subsistence [for], and to perpetuate the species [of]" its elements. In the second place, the elements of this teleologically-defined manifold are themselves teleologically defined: they are living-beings. Not only is *life* teleologically defined, but if the purpose defining it be taken to be "that each member of the class maintain itself and perpetuate its species," the purpose of the manifold and the purpose of the element would seem to be definitionally identical. In the third place, the "institutions" distinguishing one species social manifold from another are *first* to be functionally defined; and only after this functional classification has been made, may structural differences be introduced to distinguish species of the same functional genus. Thus, whatever the varieties of cultural structure, institutions of "self-maintenance," of "type-perpetuation," of "self-gratification" are conceptions as functional in meaning as (say) *organs of reproduction, instruments of agriculture, schools of fine-art.*

This whole "physiological" terminology lends itself much better than did that of the "morphological" analogists, to the suggestion that a social manifold resembles a biological organsim; the institutions of this social manifold being analogous to the organs of the organism. But it is equally consistent with these premises to regard the element of the manifold as the only teleological being whose chances of attainment need here be considered in calculating the probability of change of institutions; this element is indeed the only individual included in the scene whose biological nature is assured by definition; i. e., is presupposed by the very setting of the problem of social groups. If this alternative "instrumental" analogy is preferred to the "physiological" analogy just suggested, the institutions of the social manifold become, not the organs of anything whatever, but the *instruments* of the social element, the individual *life.*

How are we to determine which of these two "points of view" is more than a point of view; is objectively forced on a sociology that would base its definitions and recognitions "squarely upon the well-known facts of all organic life"? Only when this ques-

tion shall have been answered can "analogy" end and definition begin.

Fortunately for our chances of brevity, the issue here raised puts no new question to experience, save that which in our analysis of the morphological analogist was also left an open question. Of course, no such fundamental difference of conception distinguishes the teleological physiology of Sumner and Keller, as divided the energetic physiology of Child from Spencer and the "Spencerian" postulates of our last chapter. Indeed, we must assume that whatever the experimental evidence convincing the postulator there evoked, of the soundness of his first eight postulates, would be sufficient to convince our present theorist that only one important point remained to be empirically settled. It is the question whether the tentative *ninth* postulate, which we could not with certainty attribute to Spencer, should be incorporated into the principles of a sociology based "squarely upon the well-known facts of all organic life."

On this point, the actual expressions of our authors may well leave us in some doubt. If one accepted as final their definition of human society as "a group of human beings living in a cooperative effort to win subsistence and to perpetuate the species," one must assume (as has already been remarked) that a social manifold is not only composed of teleological elements, but is itself teleologically defined. And surely it is here defined in such a way that the purpose of the manifold is *identical* with the purpose of each of its elements. To accept this definition, is entirely equivalent to incorporating into one's system of postulates, that *ninth*, tentative, suggestion which, *if* accepted, would close the system completely: it is the postulate that in a manifold to be called *social*, the manifold's one property of structural adaptability is dependent on element-interests alone. In this case, the properties of the elements composing the group, are assumed to be not only necessary (*Post.* 8) but sufficient to determine the properties defining the manifold as *social*. But, throughout all science, this is the very *double condition* which if satisfied excludes the manifold fulfilling it from the class of manifolds called *groups*. "A *group* of human beings living in the cooperative effort" to win this end would simply not be a *group;* and

if it is to be called "human society," then human societies are such social manifolds as are explicitly *not* social groups.

But, as was said, one may well hesitate to accept this preliminary definition as summing up the final opinion of Sumner and Keller on the subject of societies and social groups. There are passages to be considered which seem to be of exactly opposite import; passages, too, whose very wording shows the contradiction pointed out in the last paragraph to result from no mere "difference in the use of words." That our authors use the term *group* in exactly the sense we have accepted throughout, will be evident enough if we review the reasons they have advanced for insisting, in later arguments, on that group-character of social manifolds which their preliminary definition seems to deny such societies. The passages in question having been quoted verbatim, we permit ourselves in recalling them, to paraphrase them in our own idiom, and order them to our immediate purpose.

> Human society has a purpose not to be calculated from the purposes of the individual elements composing it. This property of the combination is not the sum of the properties of its components. Just as no one from the properties of its cells could predict the properties of a biological individual, so no one from the properties of its citizens could predict the properties of a social individual. In biology there is a body (group) to be studied as well as a cell (element); in sociology there is a society (group) as well as a manifold of individual bodies (*social* elements, *biological* groups).

Nothing, in our estimation, could more firmly establish a given manifold as a group than the proof that the foregoing statements were true of it. It would then be a manifold whose future could not be statistically predicted without taking into account properties of the manifold that were *not* determined by any properties of the elements composing it. And if the elements were living bodies, the group would be a social body; a science of such bodies, calculating its probabilities of adaptation in terms not of element-interests alone, but of group-interests as well, would be a science which, however much it presupposed a biology or psychology of living individuals, could never be reduced to such sciences. It would be essentially sociology as an "independent" (i. e., indispensable) science.

Now, of course, it is impossible that each manifold of the class *social,* should be one in which the manifold-properties specific to the class are simultaneously determined by, and *not* determined by the element-properties involved. The probability of structural adaptations in societies cannot be at the same time determined by member-interests, and by some interest other than any member-interest. And yet, when it is remembered that it lies in the meaning of *adaptive* changes that they are always means-to-an-end, that they must therefore be the potential production of some producer, calculated to enhance the potential producer's chances of attainment, our authors seem to be demanding of a human society that it reconcile in itself just this contradiction of defining purposes. In this appearance of asking the impossible of societies, they stand by no means alone; it is the general fate of societies to be treated in this way by those who have written most about them.

It should be clear that no satisfactory reconciliation is promised by the suggestion to which most theorists resort when made sensible of the contradiction implied in a society that shall at once adapt its institutions to the interest of its members, and yet let its adaptations be controlled by some other (and therefore contradictory) interest—usually supposed to be "the society's own." There is no point in the suggestion that *actual* societies are groups tyrannized over by collective ends; and that only in the *ideal* does society approach the state of being "a group of human beings living in a cooperative effort" to win for each element what is most to the element's interest. In this case, it would seem that a social group grew *better* the nearer it came to being no group at all; that the only *good* group could be a vanished group; that a social manifold's claim to be treated as a group must be made in virtue of its vices.

But the decision, as all others arising in the course of history, we leave for later history. Meanwhile, it will be recognized that such history as has been so far reviewed gives us perfectly good, though not exhaustive examples of social manifolds falling under the *Classes 1, 2, 4,* of the four classes into some one of which any possible social manifold must fall. The question will naturally arise, What examples can be found of manifolds of *Class 3,*

purporting to be social manifolds? The answer is, Outside of poetry, none. There is no serious attempt to construct a social manifold, such that the manifold shall be teleologically defined, the elements not. And for this fact of history, the general theory of teleology on which our present reflections are based would offer a definite reason; though there is here no space to argue its claims to acceptance. There *is* a class of manifolds whose elements are ateologically defined (e. g. mechanically-conditioned points, or "atoms" of a mechanical system), and which yet as a class is definable only in terms of purpose. In the whole domain of *life*, there is but one example of such a manifold, and that is a group characterized by the double condition, that to the properties attributed to the manifold the properties attributable to the elements are neither necessary nor sufficient determinants. This manifold, a teleological manifold composed of mechanical elements, may well be a living being; but if so, it is the most elementary of living beings and cannot from any point of view be composed of more than one living being: it is, if living, essentially a biological *individual*. But a society, whether or not a group, is essentially a manifold of biological individuals; therefore, there can never be a sociology representing *society* to be a manifold of *Class 3;* there can perfectly well be a biology representing the simplest case of *life* to be a manifold of this class.

Our sampling of all possible classes of manifold, in the hope of catching from some one of them a suggestion as to the nature of a social group, is as complete as circumstances permit. Any further use history may have for us, must be conditioned on its offering us examples of properties attributable to manifolds and elements, other than the *biological* properties to which our discussion has been confined. We turn to the chapter of history in which the *psychological* analyst appears; the chapter devoted to recent attempts to establish analogies between an individual *mind*, and the *mind* of a manifold claiming to be a social group.

## IV

### The Analogists: Psychological; Teleological

By this time it will have become apparent in what the analogical method consists. It starts with the assumption of our complete ability to recognize and identify an individual of a given class; e. g., the class *living-being*. It conceives itself to be presented with an individual of a named but undefined class *X;* e. g., a *social-group*. It then attempts to discover as many likenesses as possible between the member of the presumably well-known class, and the individual of unknown class with which it is presented. Its hope in general is that it may find sufficient analogies to warrant it in including the as yet unclassified individual in the same class as that in which the well-known individual is already included. The history of an analogical method so understood may evidently record two sorts of development, or at least of variation. Along one line of change, the "known" individual may be kept constant, the type of analogy varied, e. g., the known individual may remain biological, the analogy sought may change from a *morphological* to a *physiological* type. Along another, the class from which the "known" individual is chosen may be varied, the types of analogy kept constant, save as *per accidens* change of property in the object of comparison must imply change of the attributes in which an object can be compared with it.

In the preceding chapters was sketched a development of the first kind, we turn now to a development of the second kind. Of this second kind of development recent history offers two examples: in the first, the object with which analogy is sought is a psychological individual called a *mind;* in the second, the individual is defined purely in terms of certain teleological relations between the properties of the whole and the properties of the parts, these relations being such as a certain historic moment has taken to define a thing called an *organism*. We will consider then, in order, the attempts to establish analogies between a social individual and a psychological individual, called a *mind;*

and the similar attempts to establish likeness between a social individual and a certain teleologically-defined individual, called an *organism*.

*Psychological Analogists.* With an increasing dissatisfaction in the results achieved by the biological analogists whether morphological or psychological in motive, and with a growing evidence inspired by the success of a new science, experimental psychology, it is not surprising that the old analogical method should have turned with new hope to this new possibility of application. The search for biological analogy calculated to throw light on the meaning of the social group declined; a search for such likenesses as might be established between the social group of minds and the individual mind grew in interest. As might be expected, in order to give name to an object which might be compared with the mind of an individual man, it became necessary to develop such terms as "social mind," "crowd mind," "group mind." Although most sociologists do not posit a social mind apart from the minds of individuals, they do try to explain society in psychological terms. The following excerpt from Tozzer's *Social Origins and Social Continuities* is an example of a quite general type of thought.

> Human society [we find it there stated] is not, then, . . . based upon organic structure derived from non-human animals. The interaction of mind upon mind, the ability to discuss, to interchange ideas, to think, are fundamental in human society. Its structure is mental; so the psychological basis is the only proper one for our examination of the origin of human association. The change in the trend of thought from the biological to the psychological conception is to be noted in the change in nomenclature. Formerly society was explained in terms taken from biology—function, structure, heredity, and variation—and now such terms as social mind, desire, volition, sympathy, consciousness, and will are most commonly used to describe certain phases of human association.
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> This psychological theory has been explained in many ways. There seems to be an inclination for many investigators to find a slogan to settle the whole question with a phrase or in a single word: the "Consciousness of Kind", of Giddings, "Imitation", of Tarde, "Tradition", of Small, "Contact", of DeGreef.[1]

[1] *Social Origins and Social Continuities*, pp. 37, 38.

Tozzer thinks, however, that the complexity of human association is so great that it is not possible to explain society with one word or phrase; he would make use of all those suggested.

A few writers do believe that there is a "social mind." Examples of the "crowd mind" and "group mind" theories are those of LeBon and McDougall.

In his book *The Crowd*, LeBon makes it his aim to give an "account of the characteristics of crowds."[2] A psychological crowd for him is a group of men all of whose sentiments and ideas take one and the same direction. Their separate personalities vanish, forming a collective mind which makes them feel, think, and act in a manner quite different from that in which each individual of them would feel, think, and act were he in a state of isolation. In the collective mind the intellectual aptitudes of the individuals and their individuality are weakened. Unconscious qualities gain the upper hand.[3]

LeBon starts with his "collective mind" as existing whenever the sentiments and ideas of a group of men take one and the same direction. The rest of his book is taken up with a description of the characteristics of this "collective mind" as it is found in the crowd. He does not define mind; neither does he make analogies between an individual mind and the collective mind. There is a crowd mind, he says, and it has certain characteristics.

What causes the appearance of the characteristics peculiar to crowds? The answer, says LeBon, is the disappearance of the feeling of responsibility in the individual, contagion and suggestibility. All of these are phenomena of a hypnotic order.[4]

He then proceeds to note the characteristics of crowds. The crowd is always intellectually inferior to the isolated individual.[5] Crowds are impulsive, irritable, credulous, readily influenced by suggestion, intolerant, and conservative.[6] Although they often abandon themselves to low instincts, they also often perform acts of lofty morality. Crowds entertain violent and extreme

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[2] *The Crowd*, p. 5.
[3] *Ibid.*, p. 26.
[4] *Ibid.*, p. 30 *et seq.*
[5] *Ibid.*, p. 32.
[6] *Ibid.*, pp. 40 *et seq.*

sentiments. Their convictions always assume the nature of a religious sentiment, characterized by the worship of a supposed superior being with accompaniments of intolerance and fanaticism.[7] Here LeBon seems to be speaking of a mob.

He then turns from a temporary gathering to a discussion of "the masses" in the next section. The remote factors which underlie all the beliefs and opinions of crowds are race, tradition, time, institution, and education. "A people is an organism created by the past, and, like every other organism, it can only be modified by slow hereditary accumulations."[8] "If we desire to understand the ideas and beliefs that are germinating today in the masses, and will spring up tomorrow, it is necessary to know how the ground has been prepared. The instruction given the youth of a country allows of a knowledge of what that country will one day be . . . It is in part by instruction and education that the mind of the masses is improved or deteriorated."[9]

Almost immediately he returns to the temporary crowd. The crowd, he says, is particularly open to the impressions produced by images. These images do not always lie ready to hand but it is possible to evoke them by the judicious employment of words and formulas. Words whose sense is the most ill defined are sometimes those that possess the most influence. Examples are such terms as socialism, democracy, and the like; their very vagueness augments their mysterious power. The arousing of faith, whether religious, political, or social, has always been the function of the great leaders of crowds. As soon as a man ceases to be isolated he speedily falls under the influence of a leader. In order to stir up a crowd, the leaders have recourse to different expedients. These may be affirmation, repetition, contagion and its effect—imitation.[10]

Crowds are incapable of logical reasoning. Their reasoning is based on association of ideas but between the ideas associated by crowds there are only apparent bonds of analogy or succession. They associate dissimilar things which possess a merely apparent

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[7] *Ibid.*, pp. 56 *et seq.*
[8] *Ibid.*, p. 93.
[9] *Ibid.*, p. 113.
[10] *Ibid.*, pp. 115, *et seq.*

connection between each other; and they generalize from particular cases. Crowds are incapable of forming judgments; their judgments are always forced upon them.[11] It is evident here that LeBon means the individuals in the crowd and not some reasoning power over and above the reasoning power of the crowd's members.

As many critics have pointed out, LeBon does not define the crowd. He confuses the temporary crowd with a permanent society, and continually passes from one to the other without seeming to be aware of the transition. He does not establish the crowd mind; he starts out by saying that it exists and then proceeds to describe its characteristics. He has given us nothing which would compel us to recognize an over-individual mind either in a crowd or a permanent society. It is the individual in the crowd who is impulsive and irritable. The crowd does not reason illogically; this is a trait of the individual. All he shows us is that individuals act differently when they are in a crowd from the way they act when they are alone.

McDougall in *The Group Mind* takes for his task the examination of the conception of the collective or group mind "in order to determine whether and in what sense this is a valid conception."[12] He also wishes to display the general principles of collective mental life which are incapable of being deduced from the laws of the mental life of isolated individuals; to distinguish the principal types of the group mind; and to describe the peculiarities of those types and as far as possible, to account for them. He starts out with the assertion that there is a group mind. The social aggregate has a collective mental life which is not merely the sum of the mental life of its units. Because of its past history the aggregate has certain positive qualities which it does not derive from the units which compose it at any given time. The aggregate which is a society has a certain individuality, is a true whole which in great measure determines the nature and the modes of activity of its parts; it is an organic whole. Since, then, the social aggregate has a collective mental

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[11] *Ibid.*, pp. 128 *et seq.*
[12] *The Group Mind*, p. 10.

life, which is not merely the sum of the mental lives of its units, it may be said that society has a collective mind.[13]

By mind McDougall does not mean a system of ideas merely. Mind, he says, has a conative side which has its own organization, partially distinct from, though not independent of, the intellectual side.[14] He defines mind "as an organized system of mental or purposive forces". In this sense every highly organized society may be said to possess a collective mind. "For the collective actions which constitute the history of any such society are conditioned by an organization which can only be described in terms of mind, and which yet is not comprised within the mind of any individual; the society is rather constituted by the system of relations obtaining between the individual minds which are its units of composition."[15] According to McDougall, mind is an aggregate of forces expressed in acts. He goes beyond this and calls the creations of mind, mind. He agrees with Barker's statement which he quotes, "All the institutions of a country, so far as they are effective, are not only products of thought and creations of mind: they *are* thought and they *are* mind. Otherwise we have a building without a tenant, and a body without a mind."[16] Here McDougall regards mind as pure act. According to this, he will study the group mind in the acts of men and ignore what they think about their acts. We shall see, however, that he does not abide by this definition.

Groups differ greatly from one another in respect of the kind and degree of organization they possess. In the simplest case, that of an unorganized crowd or mob, the group has no organization, hence, no mind. Unlike LeBon, McDougall does not ascribe mind to the crowd. He says, however, that the question of whether or not to speak of the collective mind of a crowd is "merely one as to the proper use of words and not of the first importance."[17] He does not attribute mind to a simple

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[13] *Ibid.*, pp. 9, 10.
[14] *Ibid.*, p. 234.
[15] *Ibid.*, p. 13.
[16] *Ibid.*, p. 25.
[17] *Ibid.*, p. 65.

crowd; for the interplay of its mental forces is not determined by the existence of an organized system of relations between the elements in which the forces are generated. Like LeBon, he describes the simple crowd as emotional, impulsive, violent, fickle, inconsistent, irresolute and extreme in action, extremely suggestible, incapable of any but the simpler and imperfect forms of reasoning, and easily swayed and led. By participation in the life of a crowd one's emotions are stirred, due to the principle of primitive sympathy.[18]

The other extreme of the group is that of the highly organized group, such as a patriot army. Here the common end is willed by all. This general will exists only where some idea of the whole group and some sentiment for it exists in the minds of the persons composing it. The diffusion of this idea of the group, of the nature, composition, functions, and capacities among the members of the group constitutes the "self-consciousness" of the group mind.[19] Here McDougall seems to be thinking of the mind of the group, not as pure act, but a substance which can meditate over the acts of the group. It is difficult to understand how this idea of the group in the minds of its members can be the self-consciousness of the group mind or even the group mind itself. According to this, the group mind would be nothing apart from the minds of the individuals in the group.

This "self-consciousness" of the group is due to a sentiment existing in the minds of its members. It is an outgrowth of the self-regarding sentiment. It is the extension of the self-regarding sentiment of each member of the group to the group as a whole that binds the group together and renders it as a collective individual capable of collective volition. This self-consciousness of the group is the essential condition of all higher group life. The group spirit, involving knowledge of the group itself, some idea of the group, and some sentiment of devotion or attachment to the group, is the essential condition of all developed collective life.[20]

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[18] *Ibid.*, p. 36.
[19] *Ibid.*, p. 76.
[20] *Ibid.*, p. 78.

The mind of any nation occupies some intermediate position in the scale of which the crowd and the patriotic army are extreme types. It differs from both in being immensely more complex, and also in that the influence of the past dominates and determines to a much greater extent the mental life of the present.[21] The essential condition for lack of which any group of people would fall short of nationhood, is organization. This is not material organization but "such mental organization as will render the group capable of effective group life, of collective deliberation and collective volition."[22] In other words, a nation is a people enjoying some degree of political independence and possessed of a national mind and character, and therefore capable of national deliberation and national volition. Here again he returns to mind as a deliberating substance.

McDougall then defines what he means by mind and character. "The two words really cover the same content," he says. "When we speak of the individual mind or character, we mean the organized system of mental or psychical forces which expresses itself in the behavior [and note], in the consciousness of the individual man. Any such organized system has two aspects or sides which, though intimately related, may be considered abstractly as distinct—namely, the intellectual or cognitive aspect, and the volitional, conative, or affective aspect. When we use the word 'mind' in speaking of any such system, we give prominence to its intellectual side; when we say 'character' we draw attention to its conative or affective side. . . . We accept unreservedly the notion of the collective mind, while suspending judgment upon the notion of a 'collective consciousness'."[23] Here he confuses individual mind and individual consciousness. He also makes the national mind the same as the national character. "Just, then, as the nation, as a certain social group," says Fouilleé,—and McDougall agrees,—"has an existence different from (though not separate from) the existence of the individuals, so the national

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[21] *Ibid.*, p. 148.
[22] *Ibid.*, p. 141.
[23] *Ibid.*, pp. 141, 142.

character implies that particular combination of mental forces of which the national life is the external manifestation."[24]

That McDougall has not succeeded in clarifying the confusion that exists in regard to the concept of the group mind, is the opinion of more than one critic. His group mind seems to mean little more than the minds of the individuals in the group, each one of which is conscious of the group's end or purpose. Even if he had succeeded in establishing a substantial super-individual mind, his concept could not meet the criticism of a Kantian or skeptical idealism. To "such a criticism," writes Dennes, "it cannot appear otherwise than as viciously metaphysical; as a case of the construction by the reason of an idea which neither has basis in perception nor is required as a presupposition of knowing. At the same time, the conception is unacceptable to natural scientists and 'radical empiricists'. It is impossible to discover any physical or nervous structure which more than analogically corresponds to such a mind; and it is only in such structures and their 'behavior' that naturalists and empiricists will admit any evidences of the existence or the operation of a mind of any sort. Again, the idea of a group mind is unacceptable to certain realists because it does not seem to be logically 'hard'; it is neither a sense datum nor yet a 'minimal', 'primitive', or simple logical elaboration of sense data, and it is only entities of one or other of these two sorts that some contemporary realists are accustomed to look upon as real."[25]

These animadversions of Dennes on the methods and results of the psychological analogists are reproduced at length, because they are in a certain respect typical of the history of the criticism directed against the successive moments that make up the history of the analogical method. By far the greater number of objectors to whatever illustration of the analogical motive, have quarreled either with the inadequate meaning or with the non-empirical nature of the object with which it was sought to establish

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[24] *Ibid.*, p. 150.
[25] *The Method and Presuppositions of Group Psychology*, pp. 136, 137.

analogy. Perhaps we begin to see that such criticism cannot be very profound; rather does it show the analogist and his critic to share a certain misconception of the ultimate problem involved. For it seems fairly clear that any progress toward a definition of social group must conceive the end sought by an analogical method to be simultaneously two things: a *redefinition* of an object with which analogy is to be established; and a *new definition* of the object whose analogies with the first are sought. In which case, it is futile to complain that the analogists have introduced terms without setting forth the experimental method by which the existence of objects denoted by such terms may be established. For no question can be put to the issue of experiment until it is well asked; and no question can be well asked in terms that have not yet been defined. The search for definitions of such terms as "biological group," "psychological group," "sociological group"; and the search for an experimental method of arriving at laws applicable to such groups, constitute not two searches of which one can progress independently of the other, but two formulations of the same object of research; progress under the one formula and progress under the other can advance only *pari passu.*

Our own criticism of the psychological analogists would be of a different order, but it is of precisely the same order as the criticism suggested by all previous examples of analogical method. To us, it seems clear that the question, "What constitutes a social group," can never be answered by a method which assumes us already to know what is meant by a group, as distinguished from a manifold in general; and it has become increasingly clear as the course of history developed that a problem met in one form at the very first stage of our reflection has been met in other forms at every subsequent stage. This problem is fundamentally a problem not for the physicist, or biologist, or psychologist, but for the pure logician; it is the problem of establishing such "whole-part" relations as would serve to distinguish, in the first place, a *group* from manifolds other than groups; in the second place, a *social* group from groups other than social. In treating of the first, the underlying problem, our preference has been to lay down the conditions demanded

of a manifold that is to be called a group, in an idiom intelligible to all the sciences, for the group concept is common to them all: in such a manifold, element properties must prove either unnecessary or insufficient to the determination of manifold properties. But in discussing those biological and sociological theories which regard both the biological and the sociological individual as manifolds of our *fourth* class (p. 28) it would seem permissible to accept as equivalent to our own, an idiom more traditional to the history of the debate. In this idiom, the critical issue with regard to a class of manifolds becomes, Whether in manifolds of the class considered, the manifold-properties are to be regarded as in equal measure means to the end defining the whole, and means to the end defining the part; or whether these properties serve but one of these ends at the expense of the other?

Now it is precisely the first of these alternative possibilities that Immanuel Kant formulated into the condition making of a manifold of our *fourth* class, an *organism*; and it is the contemporary Kantian who, accepting this definition as holding for the biological organism at least, will seek in societies the evidences of a like organic structure. It is the contemporary Kantian, proceeding in just this way, whom we have ventured to classify as a "teleological analogist." If this classification is a little a concession to convenience, still it is sufficiently suggested by those reflections on analogical method in general, with which the present chapter opened. For since your analogist habitually argues as though one of two terms was somehow *given*, the meaning of the other to be sought by comparison with the given, the only significant difference between the various biological and psychological analogists that have preceded, and the teleological that is to follow, is this: whereas the previous thinkers have not questioned their certainty of *life* and *mind* in *denotation*, our neo-Kantian does not question his possession of the *connotation* underlying both, the meaning of *organism*.

It will be recalled how Kant, in his *Critique of the Faculty of Judgment*,[26] defines this term, *organism*. It is in the first place

[26] Bernard trans. p. 294.

a complex object (manifold) teleologically conditioned; it belongs among those "products of material nature [that] cannot be judged possible according to merely mechanical [ateleological] laws. To judge them requires a different law of causality, that of final causes [teleological]." In the second place, that *organism* connotes a teleological manifold composed of teleological elements, is implied by Kant's peculiar use of the means-end relation defining the organic relation between part and whole: "an organic product of nature is one wherein everything is related to everything else in such wise that each is means to the end of the other." Finally, one has no difficulty in recognizing as an implication of this definition, that in any organic complex, manifold-interests and element-interests must be mutually consistent, since each is to be regarded as means to the end of the other; i. e., every part and the whole stand in reciprocal means-end relation.

Among the more recent philosophers to accept this Kantian definition of organism, J. S. Mackenzie is one of the first thoroughly to test the extent to which a *society* as ordinarily understood, fulfills the Kantian conditions to being an *organism*. In his *Introduction to Social Philosophy*, Mackenzie abandons the method of tracing between society and examples of biological organisms. It is useless, he thinks, to work out such analogies; because after we have exhausted the likenesses we come upon the unlikenesses, and these are apt to form the larger class of the two.[27] Therefore, he makes a careful criticism of the conception of the organism before he applies it to society. By distinguishing an organism from an aggregate, from a unit, and from a mechanical or chemical combination Mackenzie thinks that we can see what the essential features in its constitution are.[28]

He distinguishes an organism from an aggregate and from a unit in this way. A whole which is merely a collection of parts, and a whole whose parts have absolutely no distinguishable existence of their own, are both wholes of a quite different

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[27] *An Introduction to Social Philosophy*, p. 137.
[28] *Ibid.*, pp. 139, 140.

character from one whose essence consists in its relations to its parts, and the essence of whose parts consists in their relations to it. In a mere aggregate the unity is accidental, i. e., that which cannot be explained from the point of view of the particular object under discussion. The parts have as much reality in separation as they have together. In a mere unit, on the other hand, the separate existence of parts is accidental. A particular monument is essentially the same whether it is made of a number of separate stones or of a single block. In the first of these kinds of unity, nothing is of importance but the particular parts; in the second, nothing is of importance but the whole.

In a *mechanical* unity, in a *chemical* unity, and in an *organic* unity, the relative importance of the whole and the parts is more nearly equal; and it is, therefore, not so easy to distinguish those *qualified* unities *inter se* as it is to distinguish any one of their class from an unqualified ("mere") aggregate or unit. He distinguishes first, between an ordinary machine and a highly developed organic structure. A machine is a contrivance adapted to the realization of an end outside itself, whereas the primary and most important end of a living thing lies within it. In the second place, in a machine, the relation of the parts to the whole is not essential: the parts, when taken out of the whole, retain an identity unaffected by the change. But when the parts of an organism are cut off from the whole, the identity of each is lost, they "die". A hand is no longer a hand when it is separated from the body—the relation to the whole is intrinsic. The parts of an organism are not organisms, as the parts of a machine are machines; it is their nature to be only parts of an organism and when they cease to be parts they cease to be organic. In the third place, an organism grows, whereas a machine is altered. Therefore, change in the case of an organic being takes place from within. For nothing can be added on from without, until it has been placed in an intrinsic relation to the organism and to its inner end. Nor can any alteration take place within the organism, except in so far as such alteration is rendered compatible with subordination to the organism as a whole and to the end towards which it is directed. This

brings us to the fourth characteristic of an organism—it has an end which forms an essential element in its own nature. Even the meanest form of organic life, he says, however absolutely it may be lacking in any consciousness of an end which it wants to attain, evinces a certain effort to conserve and perpetuate its being, and without that effort would not be what it is at all. If the appearance of such an effort is illusory, the organic nature of the being in question is also illusory. If the idea of mechanism is sufficient to account for the lives of plants and even of lower animals, it is not necessary to resort to the idea of organism; but if the idea of organism is to be employed, the idea of an inner end must be accepted along with it. If one suppose there to be "living structures" that are merely elaborate machines, these structures are of no interest to Mackenzie's discussion. What he is dealing with is the *concept of organism*, the conditions to be fulfilled by any object to which the term applies. To convince oneself that there are such objects in nature, it is sufficient to note that even in the lowest form of life there is something which at least suggests an intrinsic relation of parts to whole; but if there be no such intrinsic relation, then such forms of life are not organic; each object of that form may have mechanical or chemical unity; organic unity it must lack.[29] The essential point in the conception of an organism, Mackenzie would put in this way: it is a real whole, one to which all its parts belong in such wise that they cannot be altered without its own consent; and the end which it seeks is its own. It is "a whole whose parts are intrinsically related to it, which develops from within, and has reference to an end that is involved in its own nature."[30]

This conception of *organism* is now tested as to its applicability to a *society*. Here one would have to consider first, whether the parts of a society were intrinsically related to the whole of which they are parts, second, whether a society grew from within; and third, whether a society were possessed of an inner end.

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[29] *Ibid.*, pp. 140 *et seq.*
[30] *Ibid.*, p. 148.

Human beings have an intrinsic relation to a given society, in so far as their individual nature is formed and colored by it. Each nation and tribe reproduces in its children its own type of character, which has grown up in it through the influence of the physical surroundings and past history of the people. The direction in which the character of the individual develops is determined mainly by the habits and customs of his particular people. Thus the relation of the individual to his society is an intrinsic one. His life is controlled both by the dead and by the living among his people. This influence of social environment is not something purely external; but the individual is nothing except what he has become through the influence of that spiritual setting. He quotes Comte's saying that it is impossible even to give utterance to the "blasphemous" doctrine that we are independent of society, since the very expression of this blasphemy involves language, which is itself dependent on society; the assertion would contradict itself. The language of manners, customs, institutions—the embodiment of ideas in the sights and sounds by which we are environed throughout our lives—is only less influential than that of words. We are made what we are by the whole society in which we participate. Our relation to it is intrinsic.

In the second place, society grows and cannot be regarded as a definitely pre-existing thing out of which the individual life issues. When one society conquers another, not only do the conquered people have to adapt themselves to the habits and customs of their conquerors but before they can become an integral part of the victorious people's life they must be able to appropriate to themselves the spirit of that life. In so far as there is growth in such a case, it is a growth from within and the conquering society must be able to extend its own life outwards so as to absorb gradually the conquered one into itself. Constitutions grow out of the whole previous life of the people; men do not form constitutions out of their heads unless they have already absorbed the life of their people into their heads, so as to be able to supply them with just those elements which that life requires. What is clearly true of the state, is even more obviously so of language, social customs,

and national character; these things cannot be made, and cannot be altered; they can only grow or decline. Changes take place in them only by a gradual readjustment of elements changing nature in the whole.

In the third place, the growth of social conditions has reference to an inner end. The movements of a social development are not purposeless, and the purpose subserved lies within the nature of the society developing. What the end so served, is, may in each case be difficult to determine; but it is easy to perceive that in all cases it must involve some form of human well-being. In changing our modes of thought and speech, in amending our institutions and customs of social life, we are trying to make this life in one way or another more possible or more happy and we can think of no other end than this which might explain the growth of societies.

At the end of his study, Mackenzie resumes his argument in a brief paragraph:

> If we define an organism . . . as a whole whose parts are intrinsically related to it, which develops from within and has reference to an end which is involved in its own nature, then it may fairly be maintained that a human society is organic. Its parts are intrinsically related to it; for the rational nature of the beings who compose it is entirely dependent for its being and continuance on the existence of certain social relations. It develops from within; for its growth consists simply in the unfolding of the rational nature of each of its individual members—that rational nature being moreover always essentially relative to the nature of the whole society in which it develops. It has reference to an end which is involved in its own nature; for the end of society is to preserve the life and to secure the highest life of its individual members—this highest life, moreover, consisting not in the attainment of anything external either to the individuals or to their society, but in the perfect realization of their own rational nature, which can be attained only in a perfect social life.[31]

In an interesting paper, "The Conception of Society as an Organism,"[32] McTaggart subjects this attempt to subsume *society* under the Kantian definition of *organism* to careful

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[31] *Ibid.*, p. 238.
[32] *International Journal of Ethics*, Vol. 7, pp. 414–434.

analysis, and finds in it matter for a criticism which will likely have suggested itself to many a reader as Mackenzie's argument developed. It is a criticism likely to be directed against *any* attempt to establish reciprocal means-end relation between the purpose defining a manifold, and the purpose defining its elements; in the present instance, it turns on the question whether Mackenzie in the course of his argument has sufficiently preserved the distinction all logic insists on, between the *collective* and the *distributive* meaning of the adjective, *all*. To McTaggart, the reasoning just reviewed, so far from establishing the right of *society* to be regarded as an organism (group), is perfectly compatible with a theory which would view the institutions of society as having no other end than to serve the needs of its constituent individuals (elements). If, the critic concedes, by "intrinsic relations" of the parts to whole, were meant relations such that to stand in just these relations to a given whole was the end and aim of every one of its parts; and if further it were shown that the relations defining *member* and society were in this sense "intrinsic," then this society *would* be an organic union of the members so related to it. But, McTaggart contends, Mackenzie has established no such premises; he is content to assume the member-of-society's nature to be determined in every direction by the society in which he lives, there being no part of his nature to which this determination does not extend. Admitting the truth of this assumption, it would imply the category of "complete reciprocal determination" to be *implied by*, it would not prove this category to be *identical with*, the type of relation defining the correlatives *organism* and *organ*. As soon as we realize that causal determination is complete and reciprocal, and that the distinction between essence and appearance is illegitimate, we are able to establish between any manifold in the universe and the elements composing it, the relation which Professor Mackenzie finds distinctive of the unit called organism and its many parts. No Englishman would be what he now is without the Reform Bill, and no Englishman would be quite what he is with one more herring in the Atlantic. Although the influence in the first case is more important than that in the second case, they are

both genuine influences. What, then, justifies us in saying that society joins individuals in any way that is, in kind, different from the way in which everything in the universe is conjoined with everything else?

The second of Mackenzie's three points, that which maintains changes in society to take place by an internal adaptation, depends on the first. But this first point—that the relations of the parts of society are intrinsic—has been shown to give us no help towards establishing the organic nature of society, since the proposition would be equally true of any system, whether organic or not. Therefore, McTaggart concludes, the first two points are insufficient to establish the organic nature of society.

As for the third point—that the end of society forms an essential element in its own nature—McTaggart holds it to be ambiguously stated. Had Mackenzie meant to say that to maintain a given society in existence was no less the end of that society's existence than it was the end of each member's existence, then the unity in which a society, determined to such an end, must hold its members, would indeed be so close as fairly to be called organic. But Mackenzie gives to the end inherent in a society's "own nature" a less drastic interpretation. He seems to assume the end of distributive well-being to be implied by any end of collective well-being that could be recognized as society's own defining purpose. But it is easy to imagine ideals of distributive well-being, one condition of whose fulfillment would lie in the postulated absence of *any* collective ideal.

For instance, a man might believe that society existed for the promotion of true holiness as the highest end of man; while at the same time he defined holiness as a relation which could only exist between God and the individual man, a relation then quite independent of any relations that might exist between individual men. Any one who believed this would admit that the end of society is human well-being, since he would conceive that the greatest human well-being lay in holiness. But the end of society would not be "in itself"; it would be something which could only be realized when society itself had ceased to exist.

Or again, consider the case of a hedonist who should hold that the one end of society was to make the sum of pleasures felt by its individual members, taken as isolated beings, as large as possible. Such a man would hold that the end of society was a form of human well-being; but he would not consider a society existing for this end to possess organic unity; its only unity would be its uniqueness as a device for serving the respective ends of the individuals who composed it. No unity can be organic which is a mere means to the separate ends of its constituent individuals and it is useless and misleading to call any unity organic unless we are prepared to maintain that it is an end to itself and to its own parts. "An organic unity is a unity which is the end of its parts."[33]

In putting into the idiom of previous discussions our reflections on this Kantian and his critic, we can afford to be brief; for the essential points have already been, if not established, yet well-defined. It would seem to follow from what has gone before, that the contention of our critic of Kantian motives is essentially sound, *if* we correctly interpret it. To begin with, when as in Kant and all Kantians, the class of manifolds within which social manifolds are to be sought is of our *fourth* class, there would seem to be but one condition under which the end defining the whole, and the end defining the part, could be reciprocal; and that is the condition under which they are identical. The test of this condition being fulfilled, has frequently been set forth in the course of our historical survey; namely, if our experience of a certain class of manifolds shows their structural adaptations to be exclusively in the interest of the element, the manifold may well be *social*; it is not a social *group*. But if, on the contrary, this experience shows the probabilities of structural adaptation to be determined in the interest of the end defining the manifold, so that to serve this end is the only end attributed to the teleologically defined elements, the manifold may well be a *group*; it is not *social*.

Then under what, if any, conditions could experience warrant

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[33] *Ibid.*, p. 433.

us in attributing to a social manifold the character of being a social group? It is the question to whose tentative answer the closing chapter of this study has been reserved.

## V

## The Group as an Empirical Concept

An examination of the most typical historic theories of society discloses the fact that none of them establishes beyond possibility of criticism, the entity called a *social group*. Are we then to conclude that the assumption of such a group-entity has no basis in fact; that from Plato to Sumner and Keller it has been a mere figment of the imagination of the innumerable thinkers who have evoked its image? Or shall we agree with Urban that the existence of the group entity is to be justified only from the point of view of value? Perhaps the idea has pragmatic value only and McDougall may be right when he says, "the theory of the group mind is useful and therefore valid."[1] On the other hand, it may be that the difficulty of verifying the existence of this group entity is due first, to a failure to distinguish between the various forms of association; and second, to a failure to advance an adequate test for the presence of an entity in one, in some, or in all of these forms of association.

Although there are many forms of association among human beings, thinkers who hold the theory that society is an organism, or that it has an organic mind, have made few attempts to distinguish between the manifold ways in which men may stand "associated." It is true that McDougall makes a distinction between the mere "crowd," and quite a variety of more highly organized groups. Spencer had already insisted that in order to be a society, an association must be characterized by persistence in the arrangements of the parts such as could only result from a settled way of life. Sumner and Keller distinguished clubs, lodges, and other groups from which cooperative efforts in the maintenance and perpetuation of life are absent, from those in which they are explicitly or implicitly present. But Spencer and Sumner are emphatic on the point that society

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[1] *The Group Mind*, p. 12.

is a cooperative association. How then, can it be an organism? Before it can be determined whether or not a certain association is an organism or has a mind, it must first be shown that something results when two or more individuals are "grouped" that would not result if they were merely co-present as mutual helpers in the attainment by each of the end that is his. Only on this condition is it necessary to recognize a purposive being, body or mind, said to be "one more than," to add "one more to," the number of bodies or minds of the beings composing it. In other words, the criterion of the group's existence as a "new entity" has to be definitely established.

The discussion of this criticism may well begin with one that Markey[2] considers to have established "clearly and convincingly" the group entity. For Wallis, namely, a group is an entity when it shows persistence of qualities, and when the parts of which it is composed are mutually interdependent.[3] Since an ant colony has these characteristics, if this definition be accepted, ant colonies must be regarded as being in the same class as human societies. Some biologists and sociologists, indeed, assert that such is the proper way in which to conceive them. Wheeler, for example, criticises Driesch because the latter, in his work on organisms, ignores entirely what Wheeler calls the "colonial organisms." An ant colony, Wheeler would have to be just such a "colonial" or a "social" organism; its individuality is revealed in its behavior as a unitary whole, maintaining its identity in space, resisting dissolution, and, for the most part, resisting fusion with other colonies. There is a defensive and an offensive cooperation of the colonial personnel. Every colony has a definite stature depending on the number of its component persons. Each has a duality of composition as expressed in the germ plasm and the soma, the mother queen and the virgin males and females represent the germ plasm; while the workers and the sterile females represent the soma. There is present restitution of lost parts in the ant colony as

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[2] *Recent Trends in American Sociology*, ed. Lundberg, Bain and Anderson, p. 149.

[3] *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, Vol. 20, pp. 147–150.

well as in the organism; if the worker-personnel be removed leaving only the queen, she will set to work and rear another brood. If the cell is a colony of lower physical units, says Wheeler, we must face the fact that all organisms are colonial or social and that one of the fundamental tendencies of life is sociogenic. Every organism manifests a strong predilection for seeking out other organisms and cooperating with them to form a more comprehensive individual. The ant colony is an example.[4]

Opposing this point of view, is that of Kroeber, who insists that the ant colony is as little a true society, in the human sense, as a caricature is like a portrait. Social the ant is, in the sense that it associates, but it is so far from being social in the sense of possessing civilization, of being influenced by non-organic forces, that it would better be known as the anti-social animal.

> Take, [says Kroeber] a few ant eggs of the proper sexes—unhatched eggs, freshly laid. Blot out every individual and every other egg of the species. Give the pair a little attention as regards warmth, moisture, protection, and food. The whole of ant "society", every one of the abilities, powers, accomplishments, and activities of the species, each "thought" that it has ever had, will be reproduced, and reproduced without diminution, in one generation. But place on a desert island or in a circumvallation two or three hundred human infants of the best stock from the highest class of the most civilized nation; furnish them the necessary incubation and nourishment; leave them in total isolation from their kind; and what shall we have? The civilization from which they were torn? One-tenth of it? No, not any fraction; nor a fraction of the civilizational attainments of the rudest savage tribe. Only a pair or a troop of mutes, without arts, knowledge, fire, without order or religion. Civilization would be wiped out within these confines—not disintegrated, not cut to the quick, but obliterated in one sweep. Heredity saves for the ant, all that she has from generation to generation. But heredity does not maintain and has not maintained, because it cannot maintain, one particle of the civilization which is the specifically human thing.[5]

The theory introduced by this reference to Kroeber would then make the "criterion" of a social group, whose elements

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[4] *Journal of Morphology*, Vol. 22, pp. 307–325.
[5] *The Superorganic*, p. 13.

are organic, to be its possession of a something "super-organic"; namely, *civilization*. We know no associations exhibiting this characteristic, save those whose elements are *men*; but all associations of men are not groups. As MacIver[6] points out, a crowd casually collected to watch a fire, is an aggregation formed to no purpose; each individual of the crowd could watch the fire quite as well—better in fact—if the others went away. A common interest keeps them together, but it does not bind them one to another; it need bring no individual into social contact with any other. It is a physical, and not a social contiguity. If the crowd becomes a mob, with its characteristics of violence, emotionality, and intolerance, it is not a "mob mind" which is responsible but rather the individuals in the mob who are responding to the stimuli afforded by the behavior of their fellows. There is no entity which exists over and above the minds of the individuals in the crowd, and when LeBon attributes mind to the crowd he is speaking of something which does not exist.

It is suggested then, that in addition to having civilization, an association must have a purpose if it is to be considered as a "group." But at the risk of repeating what has been said above, it must be emphatically asserted that not all purposive associations are groups. A cooperative society is a purposive association, but it is not a group. Here there is no over-individual entity; but each member is bent on attaining his own purpose. Even if society be characterized by "antagonistic cooperation," as Sumner and Keller hold, it is still a cooperative association; and individuals gain more by being a part of it than they would gain if they withdrew. What then is the criterion of a "corporate purpose," that does not resolve itself into *collective* action as means to a *distributive* satisfaction of ends?

Here, we may pause to recall a like problem that has a long history behind it. Maitland, commenting the *Genossenschaftslehre* of Gierke, takes every occasion to insist on the historic distinction between a *societas* and an *universitas*, between a

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[6] *Community*, p. 25.

cooperative society and what he calls a person—a corporation. This most important distinction, sociologists have too often forgotten; they pass from *society* to *state*, as though the two were synonymous. But as a matter of fact, as well as of historic use, a *state* (or any corporation) is an *universitas*, a collectivity whose constituent elements recognize the collective purpose as "superior" to all constituent purposes; whereas *society*, *societas*, is merely a collective name for the *socii*, no *socius* being anything more than one of so many *socii*. The Roman "societas", the French "société" and the German "Gesellschaft" mean "partnership", nothing more or less. Here no "artificial personality", no "juristic person" is so much as suspected of being. Political theory of the state, which went to the lawyers for most of its ideas, borrowed for its own use the historic idea of a number of citizens bound by conventions of *contract* or *partnership;* rather than the apparently more promising conception of members incorporated in a collective body or *universitas*. The reason for this is that the current doctrine of corporations, the classical and Innocentian doctrine, stood beneath the level of philosophic thought. A merely "fictitious personality" created *by* the State, and shut up within the limits of Private Law, was not what the philosopher wanted when he went about to construct the State itself. And then political theory reacted upon legal theory. When the State itself had become a merely collective unit—a sum of presently existing individuals bound together by the operation of their own wills—it was not likely that any other group would seem capable of withstanding similar analysis. "Where philosophy and jurisprudence met in such systems of natural law as were fashionable in the eighteenth century, the *universitas* was lowered to the rank of the *societas* or (but this was the same process) the *societas* was raised to the rank of the *universitas*."[7]

With this historic reminiscence behind us, we may return to the problem before us. A group is to be an association with

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[7] Maitland, Introduction to Gierke, *Political Theories of the Middle Age*, pp. VII-XXIV.

a "civilization", and with a purpose "of its own"; i. e., apart from the purposes of the individuals composing it. By what tests can the presence of such a purpose be determined? In law, State and corporation seem to be permanently organized groups of men; they seem to be group-units. An *universitas* in jurisprudence is regarded as an individual over and above the individuals composing it. The idea is not new to the sociologist and is to be seen in the nineteenth century theory that the State is a personality. Jellinek, for example, insists that personality is no more a figurative attribute of the State, than it is a figurative attribute of any other individual admitted to be a person. A person is never a concrete being but an abstraction. *Personality* is never to be identified with (physical) *individuality*, but signifies a capacity on the part of some individual already identified, for unified, continuous, reasoning volition. A *person* must exhibit, in addition to a certain physical unity, an ideal unity of purpose. It is unity and uniqueness of purpose that "individuates" the human being; and individuality, in all practical thinking, furnishes the teleological criterion that distinguishes one person from another. Purely physical methods of individuating can yield only atoms and groups of atoms; without introducing the idea of purpose, no individual is to be recognized as more than a congeries of atoms; none can be known as a person. A complex of atoms becomes a teleological unity when it is conceived as a manifold of elements bound together by a common aim. That elements known under one classification as *many*, should under another be known as *one*, presents no difficulty to thought. Indeed, all things which we designate as individuals are, if considered from the purely physical standpoint, a manifold of physical elements. It is nothing more than the application of a common principle of thought if to a manifold of men, distinguished by their manifold purposes, we accord a collective unity, characterized by a unit purpose.[8]

This unified will and common purpose of the State, described by Jellinek and others, is not the sum of particular wills. It is a unit that is obtained by extracting from each of the in-

[8] *Gesetz und Verordnung*, pp. 192 *et seq.*

dividual wills, certain sentiments and inclinations that concern general interests. From a combining, equating, and balancing of these, is produced a resultant will; a will that is a function of, but not the sum of, the individual wills contributing. The State is a juristic person. It is a person because it has a will of its own that is recognized in the national consciousness in a way very similar to that in which the feelings of the biological individual are recognized by that individual's consciousness.

With whatever satisfaction one may have followed the reasoning of Jellinek up to its final conclusion, his manner of stating that conclusion itself leaves the experimentally-minded philosopher completely at sea. One may know a *State* to exist, wherever one has found an aggregate of men, *and has ascertained this aggregate to possess a conscious feeling of its own unity of purpose.* When, and only when, we shall have ascertained the existence of this conscious feeling, may we know the observable behavior of this aggregate to be that of a single personality, expressive of a General Will. But just to assert that there is a General Will abstracted in some way from the wills of the individuals in the State, is to postulate an unknown and hypothetical unity. There is no empirical means of determining the existence of such an over-individual entity. What is needed in order to establish the entity of the State or of any group is a definition which can be supported by *observable* facts. An entity, as Jellinek says, shows unity of purpose. What is this purpose? If it be only to secure the purposes of the citizens of the State, if the State be no more than a cooperative means to the individual ends of those cooperating, then the State is a *societas* of coordinated parts, not an *universitas* of subordinated parts. As McTaggart[9] has pointed out, a manifold whose *own end* is no other than *the ends* of its constituent elements is no group, but a manifold of individuals each of whom in his own interests makes the best of the neighboring interests of others.

But this last reflection may have brought us a step nearer to the devising of an experiment, whose outcome should settle the

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[9] *International Journal of Ethics*, Vol. 7, p. 433.

question whether a given aggregate of individuals does or does not constitute a social group. For there would seem to be but one way of determining whether or not the State or any form of association has a purpose of its own, and that is to discover whether the collective purpose attributed to the association does or does not demand for its fulfilment an unrequited sacrifice of the individual purposes attributed to the elements associated. If there is a conflict between the purpose of the State, for example, and the purposes of the individuals in the State; and if the purpose of the State wins out, then perhaps we may say that here is an over-individual entity and that here a group exists.

Many writers have been concerned with the conflict between the purpose of the State and the purposes of its citizens, and have tried in various ways to reconcile the antagonism. Among them is Bosanquet, who admits the existence of this opposition of interest, but takes the conflict of purposes between citizen and State to be more apparent than real; he would reconcile the end of the State and the end of the individual by distinguishing between what a person *really* wants and what he merely *thinks* he wants. His argument contrasts the actual causal will of any individual at any given moment with his real or rational will.

> We always want what we will; but what we will is not always what would satisfy our want. A will that willed itself would be a will that in willing had before it an object that would satisfy its whole want and nothing but its want. Its desires would not be narrow and partial desires, in the fulfillment of which a man feels choked and oppressed like one lost in a blind alley which grows narrower and narrower. They would not be artificial desires, stimulated and elaborated into a tyranny of the machinery of life by the self which gropes for more and cannot find the "more" which it needs. That is to say, the volitions of the self would have undergone a process just such as is undergone by a casual sensuous observation as it passes into a great scientific theory. . . . The actual causal will of any individual at any given moment may be an impulse of sensual passion. In such impulses the self can find no abiding satisfaction. Yet they have their meaning and when the impulse, in passing into family affection, becomes disciplined and expanded, it becomes a real will which has for its object the family. The family is real and stable, and

has power to make a life worth living. . . . In every case we are led up to the contrast of the actual indolent or selfish will, and the will, in as far as it comes to be what its nature implies, namely, that which we have spoken of as the real or rational will, embodied in objects which have power to make a life worth living for the self that wills them.[10]

It is such a "real" or rational will that thinkers after Rousseau have identified with the State. "The State, when thus regarded," continues Bosanquet, "is to the general life of the individual much as we saw the family to be with regard to certain of his impulses. The idea is that in it, or by its help, we find at once discipline and expansion, the transfiguration of partial impulses, and something to do and to care for, such as the nature of a human self demands."[11] "The State is the flywheel of our life. Its system is constantly reminding us of duties, from sanitation to the incidents of trusteeship, which we have not the least desire to neglect, but which we are either too ignorant or too indolent to carry out apart from instruction and authoritative suggestion. We profit at every turn by institutions, rules, traditions, researches, made by minds at their best, which, through State action, are now in a form to operate as extensions of our own minds."[12] Thus there is no conflict between the purpose of the State and the purposes of the individuals in the State, because the State is the identification with the Real Will of the Individual in which he wills his own nature as a rational being.

It is not difficult to recognize in this "idealism" of Bosanquet an outgrowth of those Kantian conceptions of the organism which we saw so painstakingly applied by Mackenzie to the doubtful instance of "organic societies." To what deceptions one is subject who would try to keep the ends of the collective group, society, and of the distributive elements, citizens, distinct yet sympathetic, different yet reciprocally means and end, the shrewd criticism of McTaggart has already pointed out.

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[10] *The Philosophical Theory of the State*, p. 146.
[11] *Ibid.*, p. 149.
[12] *Ibid.*, p. 152.

But in the past and in the present, the most vigorous opposition to this "ultimate optimism" respecting the institution of the State, comes not from the subtle logician, searching for inherent inconsistencies, but from the rugged empiricist facing the facts of history and of general observation. To him it seems impossible to believe that any real interest of the human individual is served by the institutions of society; impossible to suppose that the force of the State is inevitably exerted for the good of its citizens, however "ultimate" and unapparent this good may pretend to be. The existence of labor troubles, race conflicts, and the treatment of political nonconformists make us pause before insisting that the State is the "identification with the Real Will of the Individual." There may be genuine conflicts of interest, as in wars between states, where the individual is compelled to choose between his greater good and the good of the state. There remain "social disharmonies, social sacrifices, and social tragedies." Are these sacrifices ultimate, or are they repaid in the "long run"? Does the individual lose by being in association with other individuals, or does he gain? On the answer to this question may hang the solution of the problem of the existence of the group. If the individual, either potentially or actually, makes a real sacrifice; if he suffers as a result of being a member of an association, then that association may be an entity, something over and above the individuals composing it, a group. With the idea of the real sacrifice of the individual to the "over-individual" as a criterion, society, with its "civilization," must be examined to determine whether any forms of association found in it are "over-individual" entities.

Most sociologists agree that society arose out of a need for cooperation against the forces of nature. Sumner and Keller[13] do not think that society began because, as Aristotle said, man is a social animal, but because of a need for cooperation. Even the family group, they insist, does not have its origin in the instinct of sex. Men and women were driven to association with each other because of a need to maintain their lives. This

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[13] *The Science of Society*, Vol. I, p. 19.

could best be done by cooperation. Certain ways of doing things which best answered the purpose, arose, grew into customs and hardened into institutions.

We may be able to agree with Sumner and Keller's explanation of the origin of society in cooperation. But society, in the literal sense of the word "societas," no longer exists. Today we do not see men formed into associations, each member of which is intent on securing his own purposes. Society, now is made up of associations of men formed around institutions. The members composing one institution may belong to many others. These institutions do not exist for the good of the members, but, in some cases at least, the members seem to exist for the sake of the institution. In other words, institutions have hardened so that some, at least, are always requiring the sacrifices of the individual.

Winwood Reade in his *Martydom of Man* noted this fact when he pointed out that the principle of one age effected the advancement of a nation; in the next age retarded the mental movement, or even destroyed it altogether.

> War, despotism, slavery, and superstition are now injurious to the progress of Europe, but they were once the agents by which progress was produced. By means of war the animated life was slowly raised upward in the scale and quadrupeds passed into man. By means of war the human intelligence was brightened, and the affections were made intense; weapons and tools were invented, foreign wives were captured, and the marriages of blood relatives were forbidden; prisoners were tamed; and the women set free; prisoners were exchanged, accompanied by presents; thus commerce was established, and thus, by means of war, men were first brought into amicable relations with one another. By war the tribes were dispersed all over the world, and adopted various pursuits, according to the conditions by which they were surrounded. By war the tribes were compressed into the nation. It was war which founded the Chinese Empire. It was war which unlocked Babylonia, and Egypt, and India. It was war which developed the genius of Greece. It was war which planted the Greek language in Asia, and so rendered possible the spread of Christianity. It was war which united the world in peace from the Cheviot Hills to the Danube and the Euphrates. It was war which saved Europe from the quietude of China. It was war which united

the barons in the Crusades, and which destroyed the feudal system. Even in recent times the action of war has been useful in condensing scattered elements of nationality, and in liberating subject populations. United Italy was formed, directly or indirectly, by the wars of '59, '66, and '70. The last war realized the dreams of German poets, and united the Teutonic nations more closely than the shrewdest statesmen could have conceived to be possible a few years ago. That same war, so calamitous for France, will yet regenerate that great country, and make her more prosperous than she has ever been. The American War emancipated four million men, and decided forever the question as to whether the Union was a nationality or a league. But the Crimean War was injurious to civilization; it retarded a useful and inevitable event. Turkey will some day be covered with corn fields; Constantinople will some day be a manufacturing town; but a generation has been lost. . . . To preserve the balance of power was an excellent policy in the Middle Ages, when war was the only pursuit of a gentleman, and when conquest was the only ambition of kings. It is now suited only to the Highlands of Abyssinia.[14]

Other expedients of nature, such as religion and inequality of conditions are subject to the same interpretation. By means of the idea that there exist beings who can punish or reward them in this life or in the next and who have deputed certain men, called priests, to collect tribute and to pass laws on their behalf, a system of government is formed to which kings themselves are subjected; the moral nature of man is improved, the sciences and arts are developed, and distinct and hostile races are united. In Europe now religion no longer exists as a political power. By means of domestic slavery, a great service was rendered to mankind. By means of slavery, leisure was created, priests were enabled to make experiments and to cultivate the arts and the great public buildings of ancient lands were raised. Now slavery can never be revived under the sanction of a civilized authority.[15]

If these views of Reade are sound, the sacrifice of the individual to institutions may be said to be due to the fact that the latter have a tendency to outlive their usefulness and persist even when the need for them has disappeared. Recent

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[14] *The Martyrdom of Man*, p. 502.
[15] *Ibid.*, p. 505.

sociologists have recognized this fact in their theory of "social lag" described by Ogburn and Chapin.

For Chapin, a social institution is a combination of certain related type-parts into a configuration possessing the properties of relative rigidity and persistence of form and tending to function as a unit on a field of contemporary culture. It arises out of and as a result of repeated groupings of interacting human individuals in response to certain needs. Common reciprocating attitudes and conventionalized behavior-patterns, such as affection, loyalty, domination, and subordination, develop out of this process of interaction. Cultural traits—the cross, the ring or the flag—embodying symbolic values are invented. Cultural objects—buildings and furniture—which become the means of satisfying creature wants, follow. The description of the interrelation between these is preserved in speech. The type-parts which produce the social institution are first, the common reciprocating attitudes of individuals; second, cultural objects of symbolic value; third, material objects satisfying creature wants; and fourth, oral or written language symbols.[16] The second and fourth type-parts may be called the *immaterial*, while the first and third type-parts may be called the *material* parts of the institution.

Changes in material culture are more rapid in the time they consume than changes in non-material culture. Thus changes in the displacement of one machine in industry by another, the rise and fall of the slave system in Rome and the rise and fall of industrial capitalism in Europe take place more rapidly than the changes in the religions in different regions or in the discovery, adaptation, growth, and development of some form of governmental structure. This difference in the time-rate-of-change of the material and the non-material culture, respectively, results in a definite lag.

The invention and introduction of power machinery have been accompanied by great changes in the utilitarian culture traits of all the fundamental social institutions. The material equipment of industry and of the home has been revolutionized

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[16] *Cultural Change*, pp. 45 *et seq.*

by the introduction of labor-saving machinery. The effect has been to strain severely, if not actually to disrupt, the fabric of relationships which holds together the four type-parts of institutional structure; attitudes and conventionalized behavior-patterns; symbolic culture-traits; and descriptive language symbols. When changes occur in one of the four type parts of institutional structure, in this case utilitarian culture-traits, while the other type parts remain relatively unchanged, it is clear that we have a case of cultural lag.[17] Today the mores of the monogamous family and the mores of the Christian religion are much as they were in the agricultural economy of the eighteenth century, whereas in modes of producing consumers' goods, the motor tractor, the steam power looms, and the electric printing press are radically different from the primitive machines of the eighteenth century. Yet the creed and ritual of the Orthodox church have hardly changed. The changes have been more frequent in material culture than in non-material culture, because inventions have been applied to manufacturing production, since the test of a new method in material culture is decisive and impersonal. The definite advantages of steam-power over horse-power are more immediately evident than the uncertain results of trial-marriage against strict monogamy. This failure of the non-material culture of our day to change as rapidly as material culture changes, creates cultural lags and results in discord and dissatisfaction. Some say the church is out of date because it fails to face the issues of public ownership of natural resources, the taxation of incomes and inheritances, and other questions of industrial society—for the Church is still adapted to the conditions of a primitive agricultural economy under which it originated. We say our schools are behind the times because they do not supply technical and vocational training in anything like the extent needed in an age of machinery.

Another illustration is supplied by Ogburn, the lag in the institution of capitalism or private property. When factory conditions became widespread, the human organism found it difficulty to adjust its bodily economy to the rhythm of the

[17] *Ibid.*, p. 312.

machine-process and strains and fatigue piled up. Meanwhile the number of work-accidents increased enormously, leaving in their wake a trail of helpless cripples, broken families, widows, orphans and dependents. As late as 1917 there were 28,000 deaths, 875,000 partial and total disabilities in American industry. Yet the old employers' liability law persisted. This law was survival of English common law practice and represented a hold-over from a simple agricultural economy into the complex industrial civilization of America. Study of the industrial situation in 1870 shows that the workmen's compensation laws should have come then, when, as a matter of fact, it was 1915 before this means of adjustment had been adopted to any wide degree in American commonwealths. There was thus a period of forty-five years during which non-material culture lagged behind changes in material culture.[18]

Is there any one who would say that during those forty-five years the industrial group existed for the good of the individuals? Or could he say that what the individual wanted, in the long run, was not what he really wanted but only what he thought he wanted?

Let us look at the institution of the family and see to what extent the existence of lag has resulted in the sacrifice of individuals. The family mores of two centuries ago were, on the whole, well adjusted to the economic conditions of the time. Primitive methods of farming with the farmers as their own gunsmiths, wagoners, cobblers, and carpenters existed. One farmer might serve the whole community as a storekeeper or magistrate. Houses, furniture, and other household articles were home-made. The primitive spinning wheel and hand looms were in use. The family was an economic institution as well as a biological and affectional one. It possessed recreational, educational, and protective as well as economic functions. In the simple and stable village community of the eighteenth century, family mores and public opinion exercised a fairly satisfactory control over marriage. Common law unions might be happy affairs with adequate provision for the child. Stable

[18] *Ibid.*, p. 316 *et seq.*

residence, home-industries and dowry-practices guaranteed economic security.

Today the family is no longer the stable social unit for the socialization and control of the child. The skilled handicrafts have been supplanted by the factory-system. Home-industries have declined and most employment is outside the home. Wage-earning women leave their children at day nurseries. Meals are often bought outside the home. Houses are usually rented; and the city population is migratory, shifting, and propertyless.[19]

And yet the attitudinal and traditional factors of the family have tended to lag. The old attitudes of parents toward children still persist. Many parents still see their relationship to the child in terms of proprietorship. They emphasize what the child owes them in obedience and service. rather than what they owe the child in providing opportunities for self-development in a changed social order. This attitude represents a lag in family mores. The fact that common law marriages are still tolerated in many of our states, whereas England abolished them a century and a half ago is instance of a local lag.

We find lags not only in the attitudinal part of the family-institution but also in the symbolic culture traits and in the descriptive language-symbols. Once the religious ceremony constituted the authoritative language-record, now it has become symbolic. The word "obey" in the religious verbalization of the marriage-ceremony is an example of lag in descriptive language-symbols.[20]

There are also lags in the State. Although war today is generally felt to be needless and useless, it is still carried on; and any citizen who refuses to take part is counted as unpatriotic or worse. The fact that the citizen is either actually or potentially required to give his life in order that the State may maintain its purpose seems to establish the fact that here is something other than the individuals composing the State, something of superior power and to be obeyed. It is difficult

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[19] *Ibid.*, pp. 318 *et seq.*
[20] *Ibid.*, p. 325.

to see how this purpose of the State is to be identified with the purpose of its individuals. Because under our modern industrial organization with each part of the world economically dependent on every other part, war results in financial distress to the individuals of any country engaged, whether it be the victor or the vanquished, and, as Reade says, it belongs to the Dark Ages. The existence of war seems to be a very striking illustration of a cultural lag in the institution of the State.

And now, in these reflections on the facts of history, reflections beginning in the 1870's, renewed in the current literature of our day, do we not find a suggestion of just such reasons for treating societies as groups as our own analysis would indicate to be sound? If the institutions of society are a "martyrdom" to man, if their "lagging" adaptations are his drawback, if they burden the living with the necessities of the dead, have we not found in them those properties of social manifolds whose indifference to element-interests would indeed constitute these manifolds collective groups?

In the major social institutions such as the State, the church, the family, and the industrial organization or capitalistic society, we have purposive associations characterized by civilization and seeming to require the real sacrifice of the individuals composing them. The presence of the "lag" seems to be an indication of a super-individual over and beyond the separate individuals which are grouped around institutions. Attempts which have been made to define the group in biological terms have failed because they have not established the fact that the group, since its purpose is served at the expense of the purposes of its parts, is an entity over and above its members. If it be admitted that institutions make social manifolds into groups because they require real sacrifices, it must also be admitted that groups are essentially evil things, persisting long after the need which called them into existence has disappeared.

It may well be that groups are atavisms, analogous to the expression of the emotions in men and animals. Darwin pointed out that emotions are expressed long after the need for the expression has gone. Certain complex actions are of direct

or indirect service under certain states of the mind, in order to relieve or gratify certain sensations or desires. Whenever the same state of mind is induced, however feebly, there is a tendency through the force of habit and association for the same movements to be performed, though they may not then be of the least use. "Dogs when they wish to go to sleep on a carpet or other hard surface, generally turn round and round and scratch the ground with their forepaws in a senseless manner, as if they intended to trample down the grass and scoop out a hollow, as no doubt their wild parents did when they lived on open grassy plains or in the woods."[21] Such habitual movements Darwin took to be often, if not generally, inherited.

Institutions, likewise, are inherited, and in the same "senseless manner" man continues to require the observances of certain customs and attitudes on the part of himself and his fellow men, largely because they have become habitual to him and not because they are of value. The practice of war in a period when it is harmful to all, the insistence on adherence to outworn codes of law, the clinging to an outmoded theology in a scientific age, the presence of public opinion which still, in some quarters requires the subservience of children to their parents, however unworthy they may be, the antagonism of large groups to the so-called "dole" in times of unemployment—all these customs and beliefs—once of great use but now of little value and in some cases actually harmful, characterize the social institutions to which men belong. They are as useless as some expressions of the emotions.

Here, then, in associations of men grouped around such major social institutions as the family, the church, the industrial organization, the State; here, where the "tyranny" of the social lag is most despotic; here, where a group purpose seems consistently to win at the expense of the individual; here, if anywhere, one may say, the group as an empirical object exists.

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[21] *The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals*, p. 43.

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